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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE
DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE BRANCH

AN INTELLIGENCE RESUME
FOR
CONTINGENCY PLANNING
FOR
NORTH SOLOMONS PROVINCE

NBP CELL
2674

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DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE BRANCH

Introduction

1. The information given in this resume is correct as at April 98. The information was collated from the last Ops Blue Print records, current DIB sources in NSP and elsewhere in PNG and some government and civilian agencies.
2. The accuracy of the information given in this resume is either fully accurate or 75% correct and where doubt exists it is stated so. Written estimates, assumptions and judgments are also clearly indicated to avoid confusion between facts and opinions.

Aim

3. The aim of this resume is to furnish sufficient information that may be used for formulating an intelligence estimate, a redeployment appreciation or for contingency planning.

General Situation

4. Essential services in the rural areas have been totally cut months ago. Major services and businesses in Arewa, Kiese and Tenive townships have already wound-down and other services which are currently being offered will be forced to cut off or close down soon because of other factors such as unprofitable operations, security of staff, general upsurge of lawlessness in these towns including break and enters and the unavailability of goods and services owing to termination of air and shipping calls to the provinces.

5. The general uncertainty about what will happen next in NSP, the next government action, the next ERA action, the redeployment of PNGDF issues and whether or not normality will return to the island continues. This

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detrimental for the NSP population's well being and good for the Government in that these hardships may have a profound effect on the large peace loving NSP population. These hardships may, in a few months time, force the ordinary people to pressure the BRA leadership to deliver their promised goods and services, otherwise become more reasonable on the whole issue, including the negotiations. Other factors such as regional differences within the NSP itself, inability of Sam Kauona to bring in the assistance of the foreign nations that he has promised the people throughout the crisis and S. Kauona's own known weaknesses as a poor, ineffective, weak leader under pressure and stress, will all work in concert to further pressure the BRA leadership to listen to the cries of the large suffering majority. This trend and pressure is already being witnessed in NSP.

Topography

- 7. The topographical information about the island remains unchanged as witnessed during the last operation.
- 8. However all airfields in the province have been reported to be bulldozed and unfit for landing without major clearance and grading works. Only Arope airport remains unbulldozed however that should happen anytime the BRA leadership believes PNGDF redeployment is imminent. All the airfields including Arope airport have a substantial amount of heavy material placed onto the landing strips to prevent attempted landings.
- 9. To date, no destruction of other transportation infrastructure has been reported. Shipping facilities, major bridges and roads could easily become BRA destruction targets in the event of the redeployment of the Force to NSP. The BRA leadership may resort to this course of action in order to frustrate the initial redeployment plans and also as a general sabotage to the national government's decision to reassert authority on the island.
- 10. Reports received from reliable sources in Arova on 20/4/90 also stated that the BRA (or racial elements) have completely ransacked the Arova Police Station at Section 21 and also the MCL houses in Section 17. This behaviour, either by the BRA or the racial elements, could be extended to the other government properties and infrastructure, in retaliation to an imminent redeploy-

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ment by the PNGDF. Other infrastructure, including telecommunication facilities could also suffer similar fate for the same reasons.

BRA

11. The BRA's strengths, deployment and activities will be scrutinized under the various area commands that are known to exist in the BRA organization.

12. Commands: As already known the BRA has four basic commands, BRA Supreme Command, the Central Command, the Northern Command and the Southern Command. Previously when the PNGDF was operating against the BRA, it had the same command setup, loosely in charge of BRA operating out from small bands based within village boundaries. Presently however, the commands are more firmly organized with their BRA members deployed and operating from more centralized areas, especially town areas. In the event of a redeployment, the commands should break up into small bands along village groupings to employ guerrilla warfare against the Security Forces. The command structure will still remain intact, however loosely it may look, as it will be the only practical way for Sam Kauona to exert command, control and implement his operational plans against the Security Forces. (See diagram No.1 for Command Structure).

13. Leadership: The leadership of the BRA remains unchanged. The supreme Commander of the BRA is Francis ONA, however Sam KAUONA has been in the past, even at the present and will be in the future, the true leader of BRA. For BRA operations against the security forces or even the negotiations with the government, it is KAUONA that will make the difference. No other BRA leader matters as much as KAUONA. If KAUONA gives in, BRA will. If KAUONA goes, BRA goes. KAUONA is both the strength of the BRA and the stumbling block for the government. Even during the negotiations, it is KAUONA that must be targeted by the government team as the key audience in the BRA team. He must be the central, key, targeted audience to convince and influence either in peace negotiations or even in the security forces future operations.

14. On the other hand the BRA leadership appears to be dominated by the central region of the HEP, that is the Kiata people. The Kiata peoples' domination of the BRA leadership and other BRA's committees and organization is further discussed later in this resume in the strategic overview of the crisis. (See Diagram No.2 for the BRA Leadership Structure).

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16. The last reported strength of BRA on Buka Island alone was 400 men (4/5/80). Only few were reported unarmed. Exact armory of the northern command has not yet been ascertained, however they would be in possession of some automatic weapons. This command was responsible for the capture of a M60 and a L444 LMG, therefore even S. KAUNGA would feel obliged to distribute some automatic weapons to this northern command, whilst the Security Forces were on the island. AR15 and M16 weapons were confirmed to be used by the BRA on the north. Present distribution of weaponry is not confirmed, however the captured M60 and LMG were last reported (25/4/80) to be in Panguna and Arappa respectively.

17. The current activity of the northern command is limited to maintenance of presence and BRA authority/influence in the area. They also are reported to be conducting irregular roadblock checks and control of movement in the area.

18. As the BRA leadership is very apprehensive of the PNGDF redeployment, Kaunga must have ordered some organized training in anticipation.

19. This command still has not received the uniforms that has been reportedly been used by central command members (19/4/80). This command's morale may be sagging as good food supplies etc. are running out, furthermore are not in receipt of goods and services that are available in central command.

20. The relationship between BRA and the local population is not good. The local population in the northern command are reportedly not supportive of the redeployment move strongly pushed for by Kieta people (20/4/80). Should a redeployment occur, the majority of people in the north will support the Security Forces.

21. As far as weaponry and ammunition for this command is concerned, no confirmed information is available. It is safe, however, for one to judge that had it been possible for the BRA, a major restocking of shotgun estridges and .22 rounds would have taken place. Manufacturing of homemade guns must have taken place over this ceasefire period.

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22. A detailed list of BRA members in the northern command is very difficult to prepare, however is progressively being worked at by NSP Cell and would be available in the event of redeployment.

23. Supreme Command: This command only has command and control function and has no active command of men. The Supreme Command is dominated by Kiote people and the location of this HQ is usually in the Kiote, Panguna or Kongara areas.

24. From reports, it is believed Francis ONA is residing somewhere in PANGUNA whilst S. KAUNA resides either in Arawa or Aroga area and frequently travels to and from Panguna.

25. Central Command: The Central Command covers the areas of Panguna, Arawa, Kiote and Keremira-Kongara.

26. The leaders of this command are Andrew PRAMO, Michael BEBITANU, James SINGKO.

27. The strength of BRA in this command is estimated to be substantial. Majority of BRA members are presently deployed at Panguna with regular presence in the townships of Kiote, Toniva and Arawa.

28. From telephone conversations with our sources in Panguna and Arawa, it is very obvious there is serious BRA training occurring in this command. S. KAUNA himself was very apprehensive of PHOOP redeployment on the 16/4/90.

29. Most of the automatic weapons captured from the Security Forces are with this command. They include SLRs, M16s, AR15s, LMG, M60 and police pistols and gas guns. On 23/4/90, it was reported a M60 and LMG were sighted at Panguna and Aroga Airport respectively. They were reportedly employed in sandbagged positions and were employed to counter air threats.

30. The quantity of subguns, .22 guns and other weapons and their ammunition in this command area cannot be ascertained, however must be substantial in comparison to the other area commands.

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31. Presently, the bulk of the central command BRA members are employed on property security duties at Panguna with a sizeable force doing mobile patrols of Arope and Toniva to Arawa township areas. This area also provides the very committed, hard core BRA members.

32. This command area is well off than the others, as far as morale and logistics is concerned. They are in their newly ordered and issued USA Army type DPUs. They also have good quarters, transportation, communication and medical services. Therefore, their morale is the highest of all BRA commands.

33. In the event of imminent redeployment, this command will be responsible for complete destruction of the transportation facilities such as Arope airport and most probably shipping facilities or even bridges and roads. BCL facilities at Panguna could also be planned for destruction in the event of redeployment.

34. The current relationship between the local population and this command is difficult to judge. In the past, the civil population of this area were morally and in some cases actively in support of the BRA, however presently the hardships faced as a result of cut of goods and services could have lowered the support for the BRA. Nevertheless, the BRA in this command has better support and relationship with the local population than anywhere else.

35. Exact names of the BRA members involved in this command are very difficult to produce as we do not have sources who can identify all these members. However the N&P Cell is continuing with its efforts to identify BRA members in this command.

36. Southern Command: Southern command comprises of Buin, Jiwal and Baku areas. This command is very populated and an area that is least supportive of the BRA's demands and intentions.


37. The leaders of this command are Michael KUDAI, John NABI, Andrew MARAMO KOLINORO, Junia KARAU and Benedict NABI.

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END

Diagram 3:

BRA AREA COMMANDS



35. The exact strength of BRA strength in this command, dispositions, distribution of arms and ammunition etc cannot be ascertained at this point in time. However reports received on 24/1/80 indicated some of BRA are present at the Kango Beach for surveillance jobs and some of them have been with drawn for health reasons.

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39. The relationship between the BRA and the local population is poor. Reports received indicate little or no support and co-operation by the local population. Reports also indicate that for this reason the BRA presence in this command is limited to mobile patrols, after which the patrols return back to the Central Command area.

Civil Administration

40. The Provincial Government is still recognized as the legal provincial authority, however its authority has deteriorated to the extent where the Premier and his ministers are now confirmed to be having regular meetings with S. Kavona to accommodate BRA's wishes and directions.

41. All functions of the Provincial Government have reportedly come to a halt. The Provincial Government leadership is also under real threat from the BRA to be supportive of BRA's intentions.

Civil Population

42. So far the civil population in the province have remained silent however reports regularly received indicate that support for BRA is dying every day. The northern and southern areas of the province are reportedly not in support of BRA's desire to secede, let alone its actions on the island. Reports also strongly indicate that the north and south are stopping short of open denunciation of the BRA in fear of their lives.

43. Reports also indicate that the civil population is the hardest hit as a result of withdrawal of government goods and services and business community. The people have been waiting for S. Kavona to bring in the assistance of four foreign nations to provide goods and services as promised before, however to date they are still waiting. This has in turn applied pressure on Sam KAUONA and this pressure on him should increase further, if further shipping calls to the island is completely cut off (presently a ship calls to Kiata once a week from Rakaia).

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44. The situation in the province is also just right for the civil population to be exploited and turned against the BRA by a carefully planned and executed psychological warfare. A perfect situation for such exercise should exist after 3-4 weeks of implementing a shipping blockade.

45. NSP people living outside the province and the elderly population of the province are in favour of peace negotiations. It is the younger groups led by Sam KAWONA that is very stubbornly pursuing secession.

46. Should a redeployment take place, the vast majority of the NSP population including those in the central command area will support the exercise. How long that support lasts will greatly depend on the behaviour and treatment we deliver to the local population on our redeployment.

Outside Support

47. Numerous reports have been received by the cell of BRA seeking outside support, especially for arms. Reports also indicate that BRA is actively seeking support and arms both in Solomon Islands and Australia. So far, there is no evidence of BRA succeeding in its outside support efforts. Some members of the white community in NSP including Mr KEMBLFIELD maybe involved, however we have no strong proof.

48. BRA is also continuing to solicit support from relatives or in-laws residing in other parts of the country, especially the NOI, Momasa and Moresby areas. These supporters must be responsible for purchase and delivery of ammunition to the BRA.

Shipping to NSP

49. As a result of removal of insurance cover, all shipping firms have voluntarily terminated shipping to the island. However coastal shipping and island shipping continue to make weekly port calls to Kiato, delivering much needed supplies. Both firms originate their service from Rabaul.

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Air Flights to NSP

80. All air flights have been voluntarily terminated. Any resumption can only occur after clearance of wires and obstacles deliberately placed along the runways. All runways, except Arapa, have also been reportedly bulldozed apart with bulldozers.

Business Activity in NSP

81. Almost all major business houses have closed down their operations. Other minor businesses have also suffered the same fate. However AEL stores, Makosi, Kins Trading, some banks and few other businesses continue to trade. All businesses that continue to operate have local staff only.

82. Reports from 23/4/90 indicate that the Aroha Bakery and New Guinea Motors have closed businesses. Reports also indicate very strong shortage of diesel, petrol and kerosene. The present supply is estimated to run out by 15 May 1990. Basic household commodities are also running out in the remaining shops but get replenished by the weekly shipping calls, especially in the Aroha township areas.

White Population in NSP

83. A very small percentage of the white population still remain in NSP. It is estimated about 40 whites/foreigners still remain on the island up to this day. A vast majority of them are missionaries. Many nationalities make up this remaining white population.

Strategic Overview

84. BRA and People. It is a most crucial moment for both Sam KAUONA and the BRA. With further delays in peace talks and the gradual outdown of goods and services to the island's population, Kauona is and will come under immense pressure to bring the promised goods and services to the island. During the crisis, he had promised that there were four foreign nations ready to help as soon as the BRA and the people threw the Security Forces (and the Govt) out of the island. Now that had happened, the people are facing hardships

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as a result of the absence of medical and basic goods and services. They are realising that Kautua's promises were not true and are further questioning other offers and promises made by the BRA leadership. There is a growing belief, especially as indicated by the north and the southern people that Kautua's promises really are unachievable myths. This realisation is dawning on the NSP population day by day, as the hardships of life without essential goods and services (that they have been so used to as one of PNG's most developed provinces) grow worse each morning. This alone has had a great psychological effect on the NSP population and is slowly but surely turning the population against the BRA. Should a complete cut in shipping services to the island eventually (a blockade?) goods and services would come to a complete standstill and only a matter of time (3-4 weeks?) before Kautua will be presumed to listen to the silent majority of the province. Because of Kautua's own weakness as a strong leader, he will most certainly succumb to this pressure. Or alternatively, he will misjudge the people's desire and stubbornly pursue his intentions, in which case an open denunciation of the BRA could be made by frustrated people from the North and the South - a totally new scenario in the unfolding. A Civil War could ensue in the province, the central command against the North and the south combined. In fact Kautua must be realising this pressure mounting on him, hence his calls for urgent peace talks. No doubt, one of the first demands he will put to the government team will be to restore normal goods and services to the province.

B3. BRA is further losing support from the North and South areas. One reason is because these two areas, though did not benefit directly from the Rangua Mine benefits, have thrown in their support for the BRA during the crisis, only to find that they have been literally left out of all of BRA's major Political and Military committees/bodies. These bodies include the BRA Supreme Command, BRA Interim Government and the BRA Negotiating Team. All major decisions/announcements taken by the BRA Supreme Command also had very little input or consultation with these groups. Therefore, the North and Southern people, by far contributing the larger percentage of NSP population, believe they have received a very raw deal from Kautua and his team. They are indicating that Kiote people have used them, far too long and the current indications are that they do not support the BRA and what it fights for. This internal split in the province must be very worrying for the BRA.

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leadership and they need something drastic to halt this trend and win popular support for its course. This popular support from the people, (after Kauona's failure to deliver goods and services and the weapons he has promised) will be very hard in coming. Only a miracle on Kauona's behalf can change this trend or failure by the government to exploit the situation appropriately. The split in the province will grow and can become explosive if services are completely cut off and Kauona continues to delay peace talks by being stubborn of using Panguna as the venue.

56. Peace Talks: The talks will continue to be delayed if Kauona does not compromise. In delaying the talks, it is the BRA that is on the disadvantage. Especially if shipping is completely cut off.

57. Peace Negotiators should never be sent to Panguna. Kauona's credibility is questionable and his word must not be taken. He is fully committed to escalation and in the event that talks appear unfavourable, he may resort to taking the negotiators as hostage, an option he maybe pushed into taking. Kauona will not make a good negotiator, therefore his short temper and stubbornness may come into play and the government could come under immense physical threat and intimidation.

58. The government should continually push for peace talks outside of NSP, at the same time cut off further shipping, deliberately to worsen the hardships the people are already facing. Simultaneously, a psychological warfare effort must go into action to exploit the situation.

59. BRA Leadership. Sam Kauona is the strength of the BRA and the stumbling block for the older NSP leaders who want to talk with reason and logic. Kauona is also the government's (and the SF's) stumbling block. If Kauona was removed from the leadership, the real leadership will go back to the man who started everything, Francis ONA. If ONA takes real leadership (presently he is only a figure head), he will be most certainly more reasonable than Kauona.

60. For this crisis to make any headway in its resolution, F. ONA must be given back his real leadership. We can make that happen. How? Remove Kauona.

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ATTACHMENT A
DISINTERGRATION OF BRA

Our main objective as contained in our proposal is to disintegrate BRA by isolating the Northern and Southern BRAs away from the hardcore central BRAs dominance to achieve the objective of bringing about the negotiations to settle the problem peacefully. Our meeting with the Southern Command held at Tabago Catholic Mission Station on 18th April led us to believe that Southern Command is willing to turn their back to the central BRA and work together with the leaders of the areas.

Another meeting with Laluals so called BRA was held at Lalual Camp on 24th April 1990. The comments from the members of Lalual division are again very encouraging to US. They have suggested a permanent blockade on the border between Kieta and Buin to disassociate themselves.

These comments from BRA themselves and some members of the general public give a clear indication of the need for a leadership to lead them out of confusion, fear and uncertainties brought about by the BRA.

Under the present situation-so tense and sensitive, no leader or anyone for that matter is willing to take risks without some sort of guarantee to their lives and families. It is for this reasons our group has proposed to you that your assistance in supplying us with limited arms is going to enable us to have access to areas during our mobilisation awareness campaign to bring about negotiation.

ARM

As the idea is very risky and dangerous we have to be very careful in deciding how many arms should be handled on the ground. The number of arms will have to be limited to 10 units for the whole of Southern Command. As the situations develop to our favour, the number of arms requirement will have to be increased so that other areas such as Buin and Nagovisi will have to be covered. Meanwhile we have to implement the plan in Buin. Proper where some ground work has already been achieved.

SUGGESTION

For Makis and Baubake Community areas we would recommend 10 units to be given to the campaign leader or facilitator who comes from the area. For Lenoke and Lu areas of the Central Buin we would recommend 5 Units and for Wisal area on the north of Buin and Kleta, we would recommend 10 Units. It is important that the facilitator must be trusted and have confidence in their ability to protect and account for the arms entrusted to them. The facilitators are to work with 10 strong and loyal members of their family of their own so that during the next 30-60 days anti-secession campaign each unit will provide arm strength to a total of 25 armed security guards as deterrence against any probable threats to the lives of campaign leaders and other participants.

Each facilitator's guards will be intact 24 hours during the duration of the awareness campaign so that any fear of arms loss to BRA or any BRA sympathisers is prevented.

"ATTACHMENT B"
NORTH BOUGAINVILLE

This attachment is basically a brief to you of meetings conducted in North Bougainville, the area illustrated on the map attached. The meetings were basically geared to make people aware of events which took place on the island after the ceasefire agreement was signed and also to give them an opportunity to freely express their views collectively in order for us to assess the general line of thinking of our people.

Those meetings were held at the following locations:

1. WAKUNAI - Inus, Aita, Rotokas, Euara;
2. KUNUA
3. TINPUTZ (Ramozone) - Buka Islands, Tinputz, Selau, Hahon.
4. ARAWA - Torokina Leaders.

The leaders were briefed of certain developments which they were obviously not aware of at these various meetings. BRA members from North were also present at some of those meetings. Significant developments were that Central BRA had formed an interim government based on the BRA organization. They were also told that BRA supreme advisory planned to declare the Republic of Mekannul once the interim government was in place. Interestingly the people were made aware of the fact that members of the interim government was made up of members of the supreme advisory council which meant that Central Bougainville was once again dictating its intentions to the rest of Bougainville.

The peoples reaction clearly showed an element of mistrust for the Central Command North BRA sentiment also in the light of the fact that Central BRA swift to decide for the rest of Bougainville. The general consensus reached at the meeting was to block boundaries to central at Torokina and Kurwina to isolate central and enter into separate negotiations with the government. We are basically about to execute this phase of our counter BRA action plan.

In our endeavour to carry out our campaign to direct the momentum of our peoples line of thinking into positive actions to yield the result required, we have raised our concerns to you in the proposal. We feel that with the support from you in what we require initially is critical if we are to have an even chance with BRA to perform our task. The governments stand on the use of our forces is understood however we need to keep our options to use the force open, where necessary to jointly with ourselves and our people exert pressure on central BRA. It would also create the opportunity to take the forces back to Bougainville to create friendship and free association with the people of Bougainville.

Our action plans reveal that the forces will enter the island through our areas to assist and perhaps to lead our efforts to find a peaceful solution to the crisis and also to meet with the people there during any joint operations.

North is a big area comprising of the following areas:

1. Buka Island
2. Kunua
3. Kerinka
4. Torokina
5. Selau
6. Tinpitz
7. Inus
8. Aita
9. Rotokas
10. Evara

There will be two roadblocks established to seal off Central Bougainville. These will be established at Torokina and at Karwina. The core awareness group will be led by myself and will include three others from Lae.

We will need protection to travel around during our campaign to create awareness on the benefits for a negotiated settlement and also to create a healthy public awareness campaign about our force when the need arises.

We are asking for adequate arms for about 20-30 people who we trust as close relatives and are nationalistic in their views. These people are not members of BRA. They will be assisted by about 200 men armed with bows and arrows only at the road blocks. We have been very selective in selecting our people to assist us. The persons who will assist us will come from the following areas:

| | | |
|----|----------|------------|
| 1. | Kunua | 200 |
| 2. | Keriaka | 100 |
| 3. | Torokina | 100 |
| 4. | Aita | 200 |
| 5. | Rotokas | 200 |
| 6. | Buka | <u>200</u> |

TOTAL 1,000 Armed with Bow's and Arrows only.


The areas designated are non active BRA areas and to our advantage where a member of our group has a lot of influence as a leader.

GREEN IS

CARTERET ISLANDS

Area to be covered by Immediate Blockade.

Area where it is a strong possibility that it will North to Ash



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
THE BOUGAINVILLE CRISIS

"ONE PROPOSAL"


before anyone can endeavour to find a practicle solution to the prolonged Bougainville crisis one has to examine indepth the root causes of the crisis, the organization that leads secesionist sentiments for NSP, examine its strengths and its weaknesses, look at peoples attitudes within the province related to BRA activities and eventually identify strategies to implement in order to resolve the crisis. An obvious starting point is to look at BRA, the organization that has caused fights, sufferings, chaos and lawlessness for the people of Bougainville.

BRA

The organization is divided into three Divisions referred to as Cominand Centres. They are the Central Command, the Southern Command and the Northern Command. We illustrate the organization as follows:



Northern Command is in turn divided into three sub divisions as you can see on this diagram.



Southern Command is also divided into three main sub divisions.

For Central Command however, there doesn't seem to be any organized system of command and everything is done on an adhoc basis. Basically BRA personnel under Central Command do whatever they like to do when it pleases them. This is one basic reason why the situation around the vicinity of the Kieta, Toniva, Arawa, Loloho and Panguna townships has been chaotic and general lawlessness seems to be the order of each day.

We refer you to the first diagram. You will note that there is the supreme advisory council. This is made up of mainly central Bougainville people. It comprises mainly of cultist followers and SAM KAUNA is a member of the council and all orders to the BRA originates from this council. Central Bougainville members of BRA do patrols around the island to see that the councils and Kauona's commands are adhered to. When one analyzes this practice we have in effect a situation where central Bougainville is dictating intentions to the rest of Bougainville. This has been highlighted to both Northern and Southern Commands and it appears that there is already a degree of resentment for the situation developing within the Province.

we have also realized that it is much easier to deal directly with BRA from within the areas which we come from as they are organised in their structures. It is however practically impossible to talk to BRA central as there is no such organization. BRA's strength really lies in the fact that there is no systematic pressure exerted against it at the people as all dictatorships are and that there is a general realization that its members are mobile and have weapons. In our view as time goes by we ^{think} ~~feel~~ that BRA will learn to deal with internal and external threats more effectively and thus tighten its grip over Bougainville if no pressure is exerted quickly both internally and externally to counter its activities and influence over Bougainville.

CONCEPT

Our recommendation for a practical course of action to counter BRA activities from within BRA itself to channel information to BRA North and South which would discredit the organization especially the supreme advisory council which is made of central Bougainvilleans. We believe that the most effective manner of doing this is to hold direct meetings with the members of BRA north and south within their respective areas away from Central BRA. Members of both BRA north and south have been encouraged in our brief meetings with them to redirect their energies to safeguarding the people and leaders of North Bougainville and South Bougainville who opt for a negotiated settlement and already there has been a positive result and as such we are here. BRA members of this two areas have been discouraged to attend meetings with members of the central command. In our future talks with them we would tend to be more forceful. All of us should contribute towards achieving total isolation of central command. We require assistance from the government and the Defence Force in the manners pointed out in this proposal.

PEOPLE OF NSP

To understand the line of thinking on the behaviour of the people of NSP we must categorize them in line with BRA activities on the Island. The following categories of people have been identified by us from our observations.

- a. Those who share BRA sentiments.
- b. The opportunists or the fence sitters.
- c. Those that do not know what is happening (those who are against).

A. The people who share BRA sentiments are those people that BRA has convinced with its propagranda that it is going to form the government once it wins the situation and that it is going to create the state of Mekamoa where services lost will be provided by BRA. These type of people can be located in areas where BRA has total control. There are people also in this category that involuntarily support BRA sentiments - they do this for fear for their safety because they come from within the areas BRA has firm control over.

This class of people would mainly be located in and around the Kieta area, Central Bougainville. We have observed that as time goes by more and more people from this group express silently anti-BRA sentiments.

B. The opportunists or fence sitters are those people that change with the tide of events. There are not that many of these type of people around. This relates to people or groups of people that have an interest in the crisis i.e: Panguna landowners; or the power seekers, certain educated Bougainvilleans who have a role to play as advisors.

C. The vast majority of Bougainvilleans fit into the last category. They are both men and women, young and old. They do not know what BRA plans are. They do not know what the government plans are. BRA operates in isolation of this group of people and in our view that is their very weakest point, is to devise a strategy on how to pass on propanganda to this group. This group tend to discredit BRA activities on the Island.

We have already conducted meetings with people in this category in our respective areas and our reports will appear in attachments to this report.

Our campaign has been concentrated on this group of people. We will continue to target this group of people in our campaign with assistance from your committee and the government, with the view of securing their total commitment to the process of peaceful negotiations.

Our aim will be to consolidate support from this group of people before embarking on meeting with the more militant groups of Central Bougainville. Our aim once again will be to isolate Central Bougainville people with the view of forcing their leaders to talk to our leaders of Bougainville.

Our strategy to apply pressure in this fashion would be to hold open discussions with the people at various centres with the view of creating awareness of the dangers of supporting BRA which is structured in a militant manner. We would also be making people aware of the advantages of negotiating a settlement and to remain a part of united PNG. We would also be collecting views from them on what they thought of the governments offer for a negotiated settlement.

THE GOVERNMENT

National Government

The national government has made its positions clear and that is, that it is a willing party to negotiations. That is really a credit to the government. It should maintain that stand at all times during this crucial stages. The mode for negotiations is academic to the government negotiating team.

We feel that the blockade it wishes to carry out should be limited. It should be selective on what services and goods it should stop from entering the province.

We also feel that a prolonged blockade would be very counter-productive. It would turn the people away from the government. Furthermore, we feel that a blockade in its own will produce very little results. It should be backed-up with a carefully calculated internal campaign against BRA. We would be prepared to carry out the campaign against BRA from within NSP as a campaign from outside would be ineffective. In that manner we could narrow the level of militant influence to central Bougainville alone. Follow up plans and actions would then be executed to force BRA Central to come to the negotiating table.

PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT

The provincial government is of no significance at the moment. We feel that for the moment it should be left as it is. Mr. Joe Kabui however should be investigated for misconduct in office under leadership code.

SECURITY FORCE

At a certain point of time we have to actively involve our security forces. We consider that the appropriate opportunity for the involvement of our security forces would be for you to come in when Central BRA refuses to come to a round table discussion and declares Independence. We would have to exert jointly, pressure on Central BRA to come to the table for a round table discussions prior to negotiations.

It would be advantageous for the security forces to come in at that stage for the following reasons:

1. That the people of North and South Bougainville would be more aware of the nature of the security forces entry to NSP by then.
2. That the sphere of BRA influence would be narrowed down to the area where the crisis started.
3. That strategic landing sites would have been secured at Bulu, Torokina, Wakulnai and Buln.

4. That the people of North and South Bougainville would be involved somehow in the overall operations.
5. There would be less people living in the township of Arawa, Loloho, Kieta, Tonlva.

From the outset our campaign will need the support of the Security force, because of the nature of the campaign. There will be dangers of being shot at by Armed hardcore militants. There will be dangers of being packed up at meetings. Initially there will be friction when we are asserting our authority within our communities. We will need to defend ourselves and those immediately related to us from such harrassments. We will need to deter militants from harrassing us and our families. We have the support of our immediate respective communities however their active support is threatened by the presence of armed militants also present there.

The support that the security force can effectively give to us in the initial stages would be logistics in the form of transportation, communication, technical, and arms for our own protection.

I. TRANSPORTATION

We would need transportation to travel back to our respective communities, we would like to be able to have access to your transport facilities as and when required, during our campaign.

2. COMMUNICATION

we would like to be able in direct communication with you. we would like to make reports of our progress direct to you. we would recommend that you facilitate us with certain equipment to serve this purpose.

3. TECHNICAL

we would require certain personnel from you to provide technical back up for us in terms of training of personnel in soldiering skills and also in indoctrinations in code of conduct.

4. ARMS

AS we have already stated we will be in danger during our campaign trail. we will need arms to defend ourselves and for those that will help to defend us. more detailed submissions are made to this regard on separate attachments to this proposal. what we are afraid of most is arms you left behind on the island. we are not arms expert and therefore require your assistance to identify whatever would be adequate to counter the threat from the guns.

this is basically what we ask for from you in terms of support for our campaign initially before you are actively involved.

ACTION PLAN

1. MOBILISATION OF SUPPORT:

- Hold meetings in the community aimed at securing community support for this plan and the need for negotiation.
- Identify and appoint a core co-ordinating team.

2. BLOCADE OF ACCESS ROUTES:

- To protect progress of meetings in North and South.

3. PUBLIC AWARENESS:

- Make people aware of the benefits of negotiations.
- Cost of Prolonged struggle.

4. OPEN DIALOGUE WITH CENTRAL BRA HIERACHY:

- People to hold demonstrations/Public meetings with Central people, BRA, Francis ONA and SAM KAUNA demanding negotiations.

5. NO. POSITIVE RESPONSE SET UP PERMANENT ROAD BLOCKS:

- To prevent central BRA from travelling to south and north.

6. NPR RE-OPEN PHYSICAL FACILITIES IN NORTH AND SOUTH:

7. RESTORE GOVERNMENT SERVICE IN NORTH AND SOUTH:

• Clean up airports and Ports.

8. PUBLIC AWARENESS:

• Make people aware of the need for Police to be present on Bougainville.

9. SECURITY FORCE ARRIVAL:

• Security Force to move into Buin and Buka.

10. JOINT COMMUNITY AND SECURITY FORCES OPERATIONS:

11. SUSPENSION OR DISSOLUTION OF PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT.

• To give way for a representative government to be installed.