

External Affairs -  
community - landowners

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disseminated to FFE and very few others.  
See Professor Oliver's interview transcript  
of 8.7.87 for explanation.

Land p. 21

SOME SOCIAL - RELATIONAL ASPECTS OF  
CRA COPPER MINING ON BOUGAINVILLE

A Confidential Report to Management  
by  
DOUGLAS OLIVER

DP 000123

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by

Douglas Oliver

C O N T E N T S

Terms of reference

Itinerary and programme of fact-finding mission ;  
24th June, 1968 - 1st August, 1968

External relations of CRA in Papua-New Guinea

- A. Problems
- B. Recommendations

Internal relations of CRA enterprise on Bougainville

DP 000124

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#### TERMS OF REFERENCE

The basic terms of reference that guided the writer in his mission were set forth in a letter from Mr. F.F. Espie dated 2nd May, 1968, which read as follows:

1. Visit appropriate people of your choosing in Sydney, Port Moresby and Canberra in reference to your work.
2. Regard your initial visit as a fact finding mission which would give you the opportunity to inform yourself on the extent to which you or your colleagues or students are able to assist us in the formation of our policies on Bougainville and in T.P.N.G. You will have special regard to the long term interests of C.R.A. in a country with a coloured indigenous population which is about to obtain self government in some form.
3. Spend three to four weeks on this assignment and longer if we agree this to be necessary.
4. Check on your first impression that we possibly require study by a behavioural political scientist in Port Moresby and some help from an anthropologist and/or sociologist on the layout of our integrated town. With regard to town layout, you felt that some information may already be available in the Territory and we will institute a search in this regard. You also felt that much work had already been done on the urbanisation of tribal groups with caucasians in Africa and that a study of this work could help us with our long term planning. We look forward to your assistance in bringing this information to us.

These instructions were subsequently amplified somewhat by Mr. Colin Bishop, who stated (in effect) that in view of previous work carried out by Dr. Rusi Nayacakalou and of his projected study of the Company's on-the-job labour force, it would be more helpful for me to focus attention on the Company's relations in Bougainville as a whole.

DP 000125

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ITINERARY AND PROGRAM OF FACT FINDING MISSION

- Prior to June 24 (Cambridge, Massachusetts.) Talks with Father Wiley, formerly stationed at Tunuru Mission, regarding background to C.R.A. native relations in Bougainville.
- June 24 (Minneapolis, Minnesota.) Talk with Mr. Eugene Ogan, Asst. Professor of Anthropology University of Minnesota, regarding his recent anthropological and political studies in the Kieta area.
- June 25 - 26 (Honolulu.) Talk with Dr. Ron Crocombe, Director of Australian National University - New Guinea Research Unit, regarding past and proposed research in T.P.N.G.
- Talk with Prof. N. Meller, Department of Political Science, University of Hawaii, regarding his recent study of the Papua-New Guinea House of Assembly (January - August, 1967).
  - Talk with Dr. W. Lebra, Director of the University of Hawaii Social Science Research Institute, regarding his organization's facilities and procedures for carrying out large scale investigations of political developments in developing nations.
- June 28 - 30 (Sydney.) Talk with Dr. Rusi Nayacakalou, Sydney University, regarding his recent study of native land tenure in the Panguna area of Bougainville.
- Enquiries among staff members of Sydney University regarding past and future research plans in T.P.N.G.
- July 1 (Melbourne.) Talk with Mr. Don Vernon, C.R.A.
- July 2 - 4 (Port Moresby.) Talk with Mr. B.E. Fairfax-Ross.
- Talk with Dr. John Gunther, Vice-Chancellor of University of Papua-New Guinea, and with several University staff members, regarding present and proposed research activities concerned with political and politically related developments in T.P.N.G.

DP 000126

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- Talk with Leo Hannett, ex-seminarian and writer for "Dialogue".

July 4 - 5

(Panguna.) Talks with Mr. Colin Bishop and other C.R.A. staff members and with such native employees as Severinus, Henry Moses, et al.

July 6 - 8

(Deomori Mission.) Talks with Father Weimass regarding C.R.A. - native relations in villages immediately adjacent to Panguna.

- Talks with assorted catechists, teachers, and other natives of some area (who visited Deomori for Sunday services).

July 8

Talks with several residents of Pakia Village.

- Talk with Sister Augusta, Tunuru Mission.

July 9

(Kieta.) Talks with A.D.O. Bill Brown, with Father Miltrup (Tubiana Mission), with several natives frequenting Chinatown and with assorted whites (I cannot bring myself to use the labels "Expatriates" and "Indigene" inhabiting the bar of the Kieta Hotel).

July 10 - 11

(Buin.) Talk with priest and Sisters of Turiboiru mission.

- Talk with A.D.O. Mel Lang and Patrol Officer Ogilvy (formerly of Boku).
- Talk with "Hotel" proprietor and entrepreneur extraordinary, Mr. Porteus.
- Visit to Buin Vocational Training School, and talks with students there.
- Visit to Kangu and talks with local native
- Talks with various Public Works officials regarding construction work in Buin sub-district.

July 11 - 13

(Konga, Sivai.) Several talks with Mr. Eric Edmondson (Master of Konga School), Mr. Roger Dargie (Patrol Officer), Father Label (Monoitu Mission), and with numerous natives, young and old, and in all parts of Sivai (including villages lived in by writer in 1938-39).

DP 000127

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July 13 - 15

(Boku, Banoni - Nagovisi.) Talk with Mr. R. Hoad, Patrol Officer.

- Talk with several Nagovisi natives.
- Visit to Mabis Village, Banoni and talk with village's leading citizen, House of Assembly member, Paul Lapun.

July 15 - 16

(Morotana Mission, Nagovisi.) Talks with resident Sisters and with Father Harding, Father Mahoney and Brother Severius.

- Talks with local natives.

July 16

(Panguna) Further talk with Mr. C. Bishop.

July 17 - 19

(Kieta.) Further talks with Bill Brown and Mel Lang.

- Talk with Brothers at Rigu Mission school.
- Talk with Father Fahey (Tunuru Mission).
- Visit to Rorovana village.
- Talk with Paul Mason of Inus Plantation.
- Talk with travelling representatives of Department of Education.
- Talks with several natives in Kieta's Chinatown.

July 19 - 20

(Wakunai.) Talk with A.D.O. and an unidentified Patrol Officer.

- Talk with Father Fahey (Asatavi Mission).
- Talk with Mola, House of Assembly member for N. Bougainville - Buka, and with several of his native companions.
- Talks with Mr. Sanford, Manager of Numa Numa Plantation.

July 20 - 22

(Buka Passage.) Talk with D.C. Ashton.

- Talk with Bishop Lemay at Tsiroge.
- Visit to Hahalis Village and talk there with A.N.U. anthropologist, Max Rimoldi, and with several members of Welfare Assn.
- Talks with storekeepers and natives at Buka Passage.

DP 000128

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July 22 - 23

(Rabaul.) Talk with R. Blow, Proprietor of Sabah Plantation.

- Visit to several Rabaul stores, European and Chinese, and talks with managers.
- Visit to native and native-European sections of Rabaul.
- Talks with several natives (including mainly Tolai).

July 23 - 28

(Port Moresby.) Talk with Captain Armstrong (Acting Head, Psychology Section, Dept. of Army); K.R. McKinnon (Director, Dept. of Education); L.R. Newby (Director, Dept. of Information and Extension Services); Mr. Ellis (Director, Department of District Administration); Mr. Hay (Administrator); and Terence White (Assistant to Mr. Hay).

- Further talks with Dr. John Gunther and various members of University of Papua New Guinea staff.
- Talks with members of A.N.U. - N.G. Research Unit.
- Further talk with Mr. B.E. Fairfax-Ross
- Visits to various new and old housing developments in company with Territory's new Commissioner of Housing, Mr. Stolz.

July 28 - 31

(Canberra.) Talk with Sir John Crawford (Vice-Chancellor) and with several other staff members of A.N.U., including N.D. Oram, A.L. and S. Epstein, Prof. J. Barnes, Prof. Parker and Prof. O. Spate.

- Visit to Dept. of External Territories, Statistics Division and talk with a Mr. Lattin.

DP 000129

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EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF C.R.A.: ON BOUGAINVILLE AND  
THROUGHOUT T.P.N.G.: PROBLEMS

I. Native-European Relations on Bougainville: pre  
C.R.A.

1. The Nature of Indigenous Bougainville  
Cultures (in so far as these may affect  
relations with C.R.A.).

Language and "thought"

When Europeans "converse" with Bougainville natives, either in pidgin or in English, they usually overlook the fact that both these tongues are utterly alien to native speakers, no matter how verbally fluent in them the latter may seem to be. All Bougainville natives, including the best (Western) educated ones, will have spent their earlier, most "thought"-influencing years mastering and speaking languages that differ from English (and from pidgin) in profoundly deep respects, not only in the meanings of individual words (many of which are quite untranslatable, mutually), but in the structure of phrases and sentence (and hence in the very logics of "thinking", e.g. about "cause and effect", etc.). Moreover, the matter is further complicated by the fact that Bougainville Island alone contains some fifteen or so distinct languages, with those of coastal peoples (e.g., Rorovana, Banoni, Hahon) differing from those of the interior peoples (e.g. Nasioi, Nagovisi) as much, perhaps, as English differs from, say, Arabic.

Another relevant aspect of Bougainville languages is the total absence of indigenous systems of writing. That is to say, communication using words was (and still mainly is) oral - a circumstance that is apt to be forgotten by Europeans accustomed to placing weight only, or mainly, on the unwritten word.

DP 000130

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Transactions

An even more consequential difference between European and indigenous Bougainville peoples has to do with their ways of transferring "goods" - both objects and services (which is undoubtedly the most important dimension of any social relationship anywhere).

In this connection (with apologies for the lecture-platform manner!) it may be useful to propose that there are three different modes of transaction - three different ways in which objects and services circulate between socially interacting pressures:-

- (1)  $A \rightarrow B$ : pure "giving", without any expectation of, or desire for, a return.
- (2)  $A \rightarrow B$ : pure "taking", without any intention of repayment (e.g., stealing, slander, etc.).
- (3)  $A \rightleftarrows B$ : exchange, in which A transfers some object, or renders some service to B with the mutual understanding that an equivalent object or service will eventually be returned (e.g. everything from reciprocal Christmas-presenting to barter and buying-and-selling).

Now, goods circulate among Bougainville natives in these three ways, just as they do in Australia and Timbuktoo, and in all human societies pure "giving" is a pretty rare phenomenon in fact (though not in ideology), represented mainly by the things a parent gives or does for a young child. But although "exchange" also takes place in both Bougainville and European societies, the rules, whether explicit or implicit, governing the various forms of exchange differ in some crucial respects. For example, although Bougainville natives engaged in some

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barter, and now in both barter and on-the-spot buying-and-selling, the more usual form of exchange between persons not related by close ties of kinship was by "gift-exchange" - i.e. a person presented an object or performed a service for another as if it were a pure "gift", but both parties to the transaction clearly understood that, sooner or later, some equivalent return would have to be made. (Europeans are, of course, not strangers to such transactions, but are usually less explicit about the necessity of repayment). Indeed, the obligation to repay, sooner or later, was so well understood by both parties to such exchanges, that no mere verbal "thank you" was forthcoming or even considered appropriate.

Between friends and allies (including affinal kin) the kind of gift-exchange just described served to cement friendship, if it were properly reciprocated. But people also gift-exchanged to others in order to obligate the latter to reciprocate in the form of some wanted object or service, and the custom was usually honoured enough to compel the donee to comply, under threat of public criticism or even sorcery.

And finally, gift-exchanges were employed against enemies - that is to say, people actually "fought" one another with property. In such situations a man would estimate another's wealth and then "give" him goods of a value beyond the latter's ability to repay, thereby reducing his public esteem or even endangering his life.

(I have spelled out these observations about Bougainville natives' modes of transactions, not as curious examples of exotica, but because - as I shall try to indicate - the kind of thinking underlying them is an important element in C.R.A.'s relationship with those natives.)

DP 000132

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Indian Haveli  
Lotos Suite  
7 and 10th August  
W T.

- 4 -

#### Land Tenure

Dr. Nayacakalou's description of North Nasioi land tenure is probably quite adequate for most C.R.A. purposes in that area. On the other hand, the principles he describes cannot be assumed to obtain elsewhere in Bougainville, even though there are some broad parallels in social organisation among all Bougainville societies thus far studied. For example, while Eugene Ogan's detailed description of the Southern Nasioi (now in manuscript) indicates many general similarities in land tenure with North Nasioi, it also reveals some differences that would be perilous to ignore if C.R.A. operations were to be extended to that region. (See also my study of Sivai land tenure, sent earlier.)

Indeed, in view of the very great importance of land to the natives of Bougainville - as the source of their subsistence (and now, increasingly, of their cash), the basis of their feelings of social and economic security, and the focus of most of their extra-Christian religious attention - it behooves C.R.A. to base any further encroachments on native-owned land upon deep and comprehensive understanding of the specific locale's land tenure principles. (An understanding that cannot be obtained by a Kiapasking "Who owns this land?"; nor by an Administration-sponsored land demarcation enquiry, as my recent visit to the Sivai area convinced me.)

#### Leadership and Decision Making

DP 000133

Until quite recently, the political units (i.e. effective fighting units, under unified leadership) of Bougainville natives were small and relatively unstable - probably averaging no more than about 200-300 people, and subject to frequent fragmentation and realignment. In such mini-states leadership was based partly on heredity (normatively matrilineal, but occasionally patrilineal) and partly in proven ability as military mobilizer. Then, as fighting came to be

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outlawed by Europeans, heredity continued to play some role in leader selection, but military-type leaders were superceded by those who were able to win supporters and outdo rivals by means of accumulating and dispensing property - largely through ceremonious gift-exchanges of shell money, pigs and other foodstuffs. Still later, this initial adjustment to European domination underwent other changes, which will be listed below.

2. Native-European (and Asian) Contacts on Bougainville

The purpose of this brief section is to remind the reader that these contacts have varied widely in length of time, in nature and in intensity, according to the locale, but that they have been characterised everywhere and at all times by the overwhelming superiority of the European ( and Asian) over the native - in physical force and in material wealth.

Although some European persons and goods began reaching Bougainville in the 19th Century, continuous contact began first in 1902, when a Catholic Mission was established at Kieta. Gradually the direct influence of the Catholic Mission (and subsequently, Methodist and S.D.A.) came to penetrate all parts of Bougainville and Buka, but even as recently as World War II there were many mountain villages (chiefly Rotokas and Keriaka) wholly pagan. (And there still remain to-day many individuals wholly or partly pagan, including some in regions of longtime mission influence.)

The German Government also set up coastal stations on Bougainville soon after the Missions, but by 1914 when administration was taken over by Australia, most of the Island's interior was still unvisited and uncontrolled. After that Administration control was systematically extended but by as late as 1941 there were parts of Rotokas and Keriaka still outside the Administration's effective control. And even in such

DP 000134

CONFIDENTIAL

"stabilised" areas as Sivai, Nagovisi and North Nasiod, pre World War II contact with the Administration was limited to annual or semi-annual Administration patrols and an occasional punitive expedition.

On the commercial side, natives' contacts with outsiders was similarly restricted before World War II, mainly by their indentured labour on a few coastal copra plantations and by their occasional purchases at coastal, European or Chinese owned trade stores. In other words, until after World War II, except for a little smoke-dried copra sold the Chinese traders, there was virtually no native cash-cropping and to the best of my knowledge no successful native-owned stores.

In summary, for the 40 or 50 years preceding World War II, Bougainville natives were in varying stages of becoming wholly subordinated to the incoming Europeans: their physical actions restricted by superior force-of-arms, their religious values and many of their social institutions devalued by Mission pressure and their desires for European objects stimulated by - but largely frustrated by - European commerce. Unless one denies the fundamental humanity of these people, one cannot help but ponder what effects such events must have had upon their views about themselves and about the aliens they deem responsible for their plight.

DP 000135

One-sided as it was, before 1942 the natives' contacts with the aliens was at least consistent, but even this basis for their adjustment was destroyed when they saw their Masters dispersed and for a time overcome in World War II. For some natives this seems to have led to bewildered apathy or revived paganism, but to others it seems to have demonstrated that the Masters were not so insuperable or infallible after all. At the same time some natives were brought face-to-face with arrays of machines and other goods on scales never seen before; and they took note of the fact that most of these things belonged to Americans and Japanese - another new complication to their views about their former (and post-war) Masters.

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Since World War II, as is well known, the Australian Administration began to make up for its former (relative) neglect of Bougainville by massive (but not always well planned or consistent) efforts to improve natives' health, education and readiness for self-rule, and to introduce them to cash-cropping as a means of entering more fully and equitably into the dominant cash economy. The successes (and failures) of these latest Administration efforts are visibly apparent everywhere to-day, but it might be useful at this point to note some less visible consequences of the whole history of native-European contact on this Island.

3. Some General Consequences of Native-European Contacts

There are, of course, wide individual and regional differences with respect to the less visible effects of Native-European contacts on Bougainville but the following conditions seem to me to be widely prevalent.

An Attitude of "Dependency"

Although natives in general are probably less "submissive" to Europeans now than they were pre-war, they still seem to hold the view (like even the most recalcitrant children's views of their parents) that Europeans "ought to" give and do things for them (i.e. "pure giving") - partly because of the Europeans' vastly greater resources, and partly because Europeans have for decades been playing the roles of more-or-less authoritative "parents". (Readers who find this parallel too Freudian are invited to supply one of their own!)

Increasing Expectations

DP 000136

Combined with a sentiment that Europeans ought by right to give them something for nothing is a marked increase in the kinds and quantities of things wanted - from

CONFIDENTIAL

better clothes and lamps to refrigerators and trucks, and from more "education" (whatever that is) to "independence" (which is defined in a dozen or more ways).

(In this connection, one of the things that struck me most forcibly on my return visit to Sivaï was this great increase in expectations; thirty years ago it would have occurred to no Sivaï that he could ever obtain, say, a motorised vehicle; and even the notion of self-rule would not have entered his mind.)

These present day expectations include some that can be labelled literally "fantastic", including those involved in cargo-cultism, and some natives' firm belief that "come independence" they themselves will be able to mine copper quite on their own.

#### Mutual Incomprehension

Formal schooling may, of course, be slowly reducing the blocks to real (as opposed to apparent) communication between Bougainville's natives and Europeans but in many crucial respects the language problem (as described earlier) is still of immense magnitude. Pidgin is, of course, useful and adequate in many situations, but in some respects pidgin has the mischievous effect of appearing to have produced understanding when none such actually exists. (How often one hears a European complain, "But I explained it to them carefully.") Moreover, the problem is further complicated by the tendency of most people (including especially Bougainville natives) to appear to understand what is said to them when they really haven't a clue - a tendency based on submissiveness or a desire to please or a wish not to be considered stupid.

#### An Increasing "Credibility Gap"

DP 000137

The wide gap in mutual comprehension between Bougainville natives and European is

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accompanied by a sentiment on the part of the former that, even if they understand what the Europeans are saying, they are suspicious of the latter's veracity - and, of course, of their motives as well. One hears over and over of "broken promises" or of outright deceit.

There have evidently been many instances of firm commitments made by Europeans - to build roads, provide services, etc. - which have indeed been "broken". But perhaps even more often have been instances in which Europeans have merely speculated about some possible facility ("We would like to build you a road"), and have been interpreted as making a firm commitment. (Here again one faces the natives' reliance upon verbal communication - as opposed to written contract, and their assumption that most Europeans have the resources to do what they say they will do.)

As an example of the kind of thing that seems to widen even further the "credibility gap" just noted, I can report having heard from three different natives that in a recent A.B.C. broadcast heard by them, the speaker announced that, while appropriations had been reduced for road building in Bougainville, the Administration was advising its agents not to inform the natives of it - "to keep them from being disappointed and angry!" (I cannot, of course, vouch for the authenticity of such reports, but the essential thing about this episode is that some natives believe that it occurred.)

4. Some Specific Consequences of Native-European Contacts

A Marked Increase in Cash-cropping

DP 000138

To me, after some 29 years' absence from Bougainville, the most significant change in natives' lives is their deep and almost universal occupation with cash-cropping. As noted earlier there was virtually none of this in existence before World War II but now,

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except for certain pockets along the coast, everywhere I went people were planting, tending, or harvesting crops - mainly cocoa - for sale. From the point of view of C.R.A., this development is important in at least three respects:-

- it provides unassailable evidence that Bougainville natives can be and in fact are strongly motivated to earn dollars;
- it adds additional weight to the already high value placed by natives upon owning land;
- it increases natives' demands for facilities for marketing their produce.

Commenting on the above, it is obviously to C.R.A.'s advantage that Bougainville natives are so strongly motivated to earn dollars, but these new developments may also prove disadvantageous to C.R.A. in certain respects, namely:-

- by enhancing the value in which natives view their land holdings it may increase their reluctance to sell or lease it;
- by providing natives with an alternative means for earning dollars, cash-cropping may also reduce their willingness to work for wages. (One Sivaian man actually put it in words: "Money earned from one's own land is better than money earned by working for someone else." In other words, Bougainville natives seem to begin to share this almost universal mystique regarding farming one's own land.)

#### A Rise in Nativistic Movements

DP 000139

Prior to World War II there were few if any manifestations of nativistic movements on

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inserted from <sup>-see (11)</sup> unclassified report

- by providing natives with an alternative means for earning dollars, cash-cropping may also reduce their willingness to work for wages. (One Sivai man actually put it in words: "Money earned from one's own land is better than money earned by working for someone else." In other words, Bougainville natives seem to begin to share this almost universal mystique regarding farming one's own land.)

#### A Rise in Nativistic Movements.

Prior to World War II there were few if any manifestations of nativistic movements on Bougainville, but since then they have proliferated, as witness the Welfare movement on Buka (and now in Koromira) and the numerous little cargo cults that have sprung up among the Nasioi-speakers and elsewhere. Both Welfare and Cargo movements are, of course, quite predictable measures undertaken by peoples in confrontation with Societies overwhelmingly superior to their own - superior in coercive force and in material wealth. In such instances, when their expectations reach a certain level and then become hopelessly frustrated, the lesser people either become apathetic and "peonized", or they try to do something active about their plight. Throughout Melanesia the characteristic form taken by such efforts of revitalization is the well known cargo cult, which usually involves some return to ancestor-worship and a prophetic prediction that the ancestors will, at some fixed time, arrange for a miraculous supply of trade goods and, at the same time, the destruction or evacuation of all Europeans.

On the basis of parallel events elsewhere in Melanesia, a postwar rise in Bougainville and Buka in nativistic movements was almost inevitable, in view of the natives' greatly increased expectations and their consequently deeper frustrations. The exact forms of such movements have, of course, differed. The Hahalis Welfare Movement of Buka is quite large-scaled, well-organized and in many respects economically and politically "rational"; whereas the several pathetic little affairs in the Guava area (including the famous March 8th End-of-World Movement) have been largely religious in nature.

DP 000140

CONFIDENTIAL

P.11 this report missing - See insert

- 12 -

#### The Rise of New Kinds of Leaders

Accompanying the post-war developments just noted, two new types of leaders have emerged on Bougainville: a type who owes his influence to money-wealth gained through commercial enterprise, and a type who owes his influence to those qualities of leadership best described as charismatic - i.e., certain personal characteristics of command and verbal persuasiveness that attract adherents. Of these two, the latter type is at present more influential than the former, but as the importance of money grows, the wealthy entrepreneur is bound to rise in influence.

Meanwhile the older-type leader, the feast-giving Big-Man, still exercises a great deal of influence in many areas and will probably continue to do so for a long time to come.

#### 5. Nature of Relationships Between Natives and Specific Alien Institutions

##### Natives and Administration

With all their local Councils and their own House of Assembly representatives, I think it is probably safe to say that Bougainville natives still regard "Government" as a separate, European establishment - and so it in fact is. Some Kiaps or Extension Officers, etc. may be liked personally and others are undoubtedly hated, but as representations of an all-powerful "Force" headquartered in distant Port Moresby they are all more or less feared.

In some cases this fear is exacerbated by dislike, distrust or contempt, in others it is tempered by genuine respect and even liking. But even in cases of the latter, natives have become dubious about such relationships, since they know by experience that postings are brief and that the next Kiap will probably be a wholly different kind of individual.

DP 000141

CONFIDENTIAL

#### Natives and Missions

I have the impression that the Missions continue to exercise a powerful influence over their adherents, but that this influence is beginning to diminish. Also, I detected far more signs than formerly of the Missions being lumped with "Europeans" in general, even in areas (such as Nagovisi) where individual missionaries apparently have made outspoken efforts to identify themselves with natives against other European activities. (Moreover, I received confirmation of this observation from several Missionaries themselves - for whom, of course, it is a most ominous trend.)

#### Natives and Plantations

While some plantations continue to employ many Bougainville natives, most of them that I visited obtained most of their labourers from the New Guinea Mainland. Concern with cash-cropping undoubtedly accounts for some of the Bougainvilleans' rejection of plantation employment (in pre-war times it was virtually their only source of money), but some natives told me specifically, when questioned on this point, that they were no longer willing to be "treated like dogs" - which to them evidently characterized the life of a plantation labourer.

#### Natives and Traders

Chinatown is still the main source of foreign goods for most Bougainville natives, but to an increasing extent the latter are operating their own retail enterprises, mostly on a very small scale and often under great difficulties (as, for example, the Nagovisi storeowners who have to buy their goods from a Buin "wholesaler", transport them to Nagovisi at \$40 a trip, and then sell them at a huge mark-up - e.g. 4¢ a cigarette - in order to make any profit at all.)

DP 000142

CONFIDENTIAL

See p. 12 of Source report -  
II Relations etc ---

- 14 -

#### Natives and Europeans in General

In general one can fairly confidently state that Bougainville natives, quite apart from their reactions to C.R.A. and in addition to such concrete manifestations as Cargo Cultism, are revealing their diffuse anti-European sentiments in considerably more open forms of expression - notwithstanding their liking for some individual Europeans. (This should not occasion surprise, in view of the history of their relations with Europeans during the last six decades.) But their anti-Europeanism has not yet reached the point that some Europeans seem to fear - in connection with which two episodes may be cited.

In Buin it was convincingly reported to me that my former friends, The Sivai, were firmly intent upon ousting all Europeans from their midst. In Sivai itself, however, I could discover little or no evidence of such extremism and what the sentiment seems really to have been goes something like this:

"It's not that we are against Europeans in general, but that we do not want them to take our land, or to engage in activities (e.g. trade stores) that are in competition with us."

(It is a brash claim indeed for a European to state that he understands what natives "think", but in this case I feel I am not too far wrong.)

✓ See p. 12 of UN document  
with

(The following paragraphs for "eyes only" of C.R.A. Management)

DP 000143

The second episode concerns a resolution alleged to have been proposed in the Nagovisi Council, prescribing complete racial apartheid in that area (a situation for which several European informants evidently approved of in principle, but did not like having the natives themselves propose). In Nagovisi

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itself I was privileged to hear a tape recording of the Council Session in question, from which emerged the following facts:

What was proposed was that European males be prohibited from social (i.e. sexual) intercourse with native females - "just as native males had always been prohibited from intercourse with European females", The Patrol Officer rightly pointed out to them that any form of racial segregation was illegal by Australian law, but the Council members refused to consider this to be relevant - as the Kiap said: "They wouldn't even listen; they didn't want to listen."

From this evidence alone it would indeed appear that rigid apartheid were being proposed - but further talks with several natives put a somewhat different interpretation on the episode. (As elsewhere in this report, I cannot vouch for all the "facts" in question, but the important thing is that many natives apparently believed them to be authentic.) It turns out (or so my native informants said) that some of the more attractive and better educated Nagovisi young women had received invitations to "go to tea" at the Administrative Post. (As I said, I do not know whether such invitations were actually issued, but my informants appear to have believed that they had been.) In any case (the story goes on to say), the girls's relations forced them to decline, having concluded, whether justifiably or not, that something more than tea drinking was being planned - a perfectly logical conclusion to a Nagovisi, for whom any rendezvous between an adult male and a nubile female suggests fornication. And having heard of cases wherein native males had been jailed for making apparently similar approaches to European females, they decided to protect their females in the way Europeans have taught them to do: by proposing a "law" which would give them the same rights that they believe Europeans to have.

DP 000144

See p. 120

**CONFIDENTIAL**

p/16 of this 'Classified' Report appears to be missing but this page ↓ could be a typo.

17

In any case, it is no news to C.R.A. management that a large number of Bougainville natives are opposed to C.R.A., but it may be useful to list some of the stated reasons for that opposition. (Most of these themes are already known to C.R.A. management, but are set forth below for the record.)

- Theme 1. "If C.R.A. had explained themselves to us prior to operations, and had asked our permission, we would have granted it; but they did not do so, so we are against them."
- Theme 2. "C.R.A. is taking all our good land and leaving us with no places to live or to plant crops on."
- Theme 3. "C.R.A. is looting our Island of all its treasure and giving us little or nothing in return. When 'Independence' comes our land will be 'skin nothing'."
- Theme 4. "The money paid by C.R.A. in 'taxes' will all go to Port Moresby, with few or no benefits going to Bougainville in general, or to the dispossessed land owners in particular." (A variant on this theme is that the 'tax' is going into building skyscrapers, etc., in Port Moresby, and that when 'Independence' arrives Papua (as distinct from New Guinea) will be incorporated into Australia.
- Theme 5. "C.R.A. people (Whites and Redskins) are after our women - as evidenced by the 'Women wanted' sign that was posted, by the visits of (excursioning) men to our villages, and by many actual (i.e. rumoured) cases of rape and of attempted rape".

DP 000145

CONFIDENTIAL

Theme 6. "C.R.A. will have a bad effect on our young people. They go there, earn lots of money and many evil ways and when they come home they will not do as we tell them any more."

Theme 7. "C.R.A. is digging holes 600 miles deep thereby endangering the Island, since the water will come up through these holes and flood the whole Island."

Theme 8. "C.R.A. is lying to us about 'exploration'; it is already mining copper and selling it."

To balance this account it must be recorded that during my travels about Bougainville and Buka I also heard many statements in favour of C.R.A. (and some indicating total indifference). The pro-C.R.A. statements ranged from lists of specifics (e.g. better roads, opportunity to earn money, etc.) to generalised statements that C.R.A. is "a good thing". (gut pela samting.)

Naturally enough, the reactions to C.R.A., pro and con, varied rather widely, according to the residential location of the "reactor" as well as his status in terms of age, education, etc. Here are some of my findings on this matter:

#### Guava Area

Here in the immediate neighbourhood of Panguna I encountered all the negative type reactions save No. 7, the "flooded-Island" theme, and none of the Pro-C.R.A. reactions.

#### Rorovana

Anti-C.R.A. themes 3, 4, 8; well balanced by both general and specific pro-C.R.A. themes.

DP 000146

CONFIDENTIAL

North Nasioi

Same anti-C.R.A. reactions as Guava, but also some specific pro-C.R.A. sentiment.

South Nasioi

Same as North Nasioi.

Buin (around Buin town and Turiboiru)

Anti-C.R.A. themes 3, 4, 6; but outweighed by many expressions of disinterest or of pro-C.R.A. sentiment.

Sivai

Same as Buin, plus anti-C.R.A. theme 7.

Nagovisi

Anti-C.R.A. themes 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8; and practically no pro-C.R.A. sentiment.

Wakunai

Anti-C.R.A. themes 3, 4, 6, 8; and many general and specific pro-C.R.A. sentiments.

Some Taiof Islanders (at Buka Passage)

No anti-C.R.A. sentiment and much pro.

Some Keriaka Natives (at Buka Passage)

Some mild pro-C.R.A. sentiment, but mostly indifference.

DP 000147

CONFIDENTIAL

Hahalis Village (Buka)

Strong pro-C.R.A. sentiment and no anti.

My "sample" (if it may be so dignified) is small and accidentally random, but it should serve to indicate how inaccurate it is to speak generally of "the Bougainville people's" reactions to C.R.A."

It also became apparent to me early in my travels that attributes such as age, education and mission affiliation tend to bias individuals' attitudes towards C.R.A. and in this connection I was somewhat surprised to learn that past employment with C.R.A. seems to have produced no homogeneous sentiments: if the ex-C.R.A. lived in an anti-C.R.A. area, he subscribed (at least publicly) to the sentiments expressed by his neighbours; and vice versa.

I was particularly interested in discovering the attitudes of some of Bougainville's native leaders, but did not get very far in my quest. Paul Lapun expressed himself as favouring C.R.A., but gave me the impression that he was talking past me to an invisible audience of officials. Mola's reactions were more ambivalent. He began by saying that C.R.A. was "good for Bougainville"; then announced that "all" his constituents were anti-C.R.A., and hence he must be so himself; and finally came around the full circle to his pro-C.R.A. sentiment again ("because the D.C. believes C.R.A. will be good for us all").

// In this connection, I learned by hearsay that the leader of the Hahalis Welfare Association was so strongly pro-C.R.A. that he wished to purchase some shares in the Company, a sentiment which the management will enjoy contrasting with that of their neighbour, Damen of Guava.

// It may also interest the management to learn that I received "reports" (of untested reliability) that certain of their native employees - especially Severinus and Henry Moses - were less pro-C.R.A. than appeared, and that they were using their positions with C.R.A. to temper C.R.A.'s impact upon their fellow villagers. (I offer this titbit

DP 000148

CONFIDENTIAL

not as "information" but as an example of just what lengths rumour can get to.)

And now let me summarise what I found to be the most highly charged issues causing unsatisfactory relations between C.R.A. and specific categories of Bougainville natives:

#### Land

C.R.A. management is all too well aware of the importance of this issue in their dealing with local natives, but perhaps even they (i.e. you!) may not realise the full extent of it. Not only is a native bound to his piece of land by economic necessity, but by strong bonds of social and religious sentiment as well. Not only does he get his livelihood from it, but it is the place where his kinfolk and friends reside, where his ancestors are buried, and even (in his myths) where his primal ancestors issued from the ground or alighted from the sky. It is no wonder then that most natives are reluctant to give up their lands, regardless of price received; and it is not surprising that they are not satisfied simply by resettlement on what Europeans would consider to be "just as good" land elsewhere. Moreover, the "just as good" land elsewhere - if it is just as good - is likely to be held in similar esteem by someone else, whether actually using it or not. (For example, there is a rumour circulating that "come independence" the original owners of all lands alienated since Europeans arrived - including lands resettled by other natives, will rise up and oust the trespassers: which may be a bit of fantasy but nevertheless indicates how alien to most natives is the concept of transferring land by sale.)

In connection with land sale, I am reminded of an episode of my recent Sivai visit. Demarcation proceedings were carried out there recently in order to obtain a right-of-way for a road to be built between Konga and Boku. In discussing this matter, the Patrol Officer told me that it had gone very smoothly, that no one had opposed the transactions. And so had been the case. But when I queried some Sivai friends, in their own language, I was told that they had been

pleased to "lease" the land to the Government for the purpose of building a road, but that "come Independence" the various portions of the road would, of course, revert to the original owners, who might or might not permit others to use it.

#### Women

In their preoccupation with the land issue I feel that C.R.A. has perhaps underestimated the weightiness of the woman issue in their relations with local natives. On my part, I found a very deep anxiety in several places concerning C.R.A.'s present and potential threat to the sexual and social status of native females.

When a European sees Bougainville women struggling along under vast loads behind their lordly husbands, or curtly relegated to the background when men are around, or even cuffed if they get in the way, the obvious conclusion to be drawn is that women count for very little among these people, despite their matrilineal mode of reckoning descent in connection with "clan" (i.e. matri-lineage) membership. It is, of course, true that Bougainville men, by and large, "treat" their womenfolk somewhat differently from the ways Europeans profess to do - but one should not conclude therefrom that Bougainville women are a correspondingly socially devalued lot. They are in fact very highly valued, though in ways that differ somewhat from those of Europeans. A European man can, for example, survive quite nicely on his own, but a Bougainville man without a woman (i.e. a wife) in his household would experience great difficulty in subsisting, quite apart from his social and sexual deprivations. And speaking of the sexual side of native life, the fact that most Bougainville women may appear far from attractive to European males - a far cry from the glamorous Hollywood South Seas belle - should not lead one to assume that they appear unattractive to the Bougainville male! And finally, if my observations in Sivai may be taken as a guide (and I believe that they can), most Bougainville natives are considerably more puritanical in sexual attitudes than, say, a community of middle-class Americans (or perhaps even Australians!).

DP 000150

CONFIDENTIAL

In other words, the woman issue is not to be taken lightly in C.R.A.'s estimate of the human problems it faces on Bougainville.

#### Broken "Promise"

This recurring complaint against C.R.A. should be taken seriously by C.R.A. management, however unfounded it may be. As noted earlier, when a C.R.A. employer says "maybe", the native listener usually concludes "will". In other words, remembering the reliance that these basically illiterate people place on verbal assertion (as contrasted with written "contracts"), it behooves C.R.A. to scrupulously avoid giving any impression that it may do something which it may eventually not do.

#### Dependency and "Grease"

With regard to transactions between Europeans and Bougainville natives I should like to propose that the latter are somewhat ambivalent in their ideas about what takes place. On the one hand, in view of their dependency upon Europeans - their long experience of subordination, of being forced to accept that, "papa (i.e. European masters) know best" - they are logically correct in concluding that Europeans (as immensely rich and parent-like) ought to give them things without expectation of any return. On the other hand, when they view themselves as adults in their dealings with Europeans they conceive of the transaction as being one between non-related adults, and thus requiring reciprocity (whether the terms of the return "gift" are made explicit or not).

Hence, nearly every transaction between Europeans and natives (except for on-the-spot, voluntarily tendered buying-and-selling, the modern variant of barter) will tend to be viewed in either or both ways. Thus, an object or a scholarship or a truck ride or some medical service provided by a European, will be viewed as a parental-like "pure gift" requiring no return (not even a verbal "Thank you", which in any case is valueless to most natives); or a

DP 000151

CONFIDENTIAL

"gift exchange" which most definitely does require a return, whether explicitly stated or not; or both. (To any European who ponders the matter it will come as no surprise that Bougainville natives, like themselves, sometimes entertain ambiguous and even contradictory interpretations about other peoples actions towards themselves.)

The result of all this is that Europeans experience everything from hurt feelings to disgust when they are not "thanked", and that most natives are made anxious when they are "given" something by Europeans without some indication of what is expected in return. (In my view, the natives are more realistic, and even more honest, in their interpretations than the Europeans; for when all is said and done, most Europeans who make what they call "pure gifts" to natives do in fact expect some return and usually some return more substantial than a perfunctory "Thank you".)

#### Native Self-views

Europeans are great talkers about the importance of "self esteem" or "Self confidence" or "honest pride", etc., but they tend to overlook the fact that such values may be rated just as highly by dark-skinned peoples living in squalid shanties and wearing gee-gaws and tattered garments. (For example, "It is a mistake to spoil the natives" or "They respond best to firm treatment".) And in adopting this attitude most Europeans are quite unable or unwilling to realise how contact with Europeans has tended to transform natives' views of themselves. (What would happen, for example, to Europeans' self esteem if they were to be absolutely and irrevocably subordinated to a race of vastly superior martians?)

Evidently, some Bougainville natives have learned to make more or less successful (or at least tolerable) adjustments to their condition, and others are still attempting (somewhat pathetically, at the present) to fight against it, while still others have long since lost out. There is, of course, nothing C.R.A. can do about the larger issue of the Bougainville natives' historical...

DP 000152

**CONFIDENTIAL**

subordination to Europeans; but it can over time perhaps play a modest role in restoring some of the lost self-esteem. More relevant to my present concern, however, is the requirement that C.R.A. recognise the situation regarding natives' self-views in their dealings with them. In other words, through no fault of its own, C.R.A. will in most cases be dealing with a native who either is skillful in dissimulation, or who has a chip on his shoulder, or who is psychologically deficient in the important human ingredient of healthy self-esteem.

Some Predictions Regarding External Relations  
Between C.R.A. and Bougainville Natives

My first prediction is that regardless of C.R.A.'s efforts, there will remain some hard-core opposition to its enterprise on the part of several of the individuals directly deprived of their land, or forced to resettle elsewhere. I suggest that this be recognised as an insoluble problem and hence not even worth trying to solve. (This, of course, does not rule out further "pure gift" altruism towards them on C.R.A.'s part. Even though the recipients will probably continue to regard such as "grease", it will at least help C.R.A. to absolve some of its own feeling of guilt!)

I predict that there will continue to be organised opposition to C.R.A. on the part of Damen-like movements and that this may even increase within the first few years of mining. Moreover, I suggest that such organised opposition may in the long run be a good thing for C.R.A. - provided it doesn't go too far. In the interest of humanitarianism, a rational, organised reaction is a healthier phenomenon than a totally apathetic surrender, or a series of small scale, guerilla-like, Cargo-patterned reactions. And over the long run an organised opposition, within bounds, might help restore natives' self esteem and thereby make them more useful partners in the long-term enterprise of developing Bougainville's resources, including its copper. (As a parallel, I suggest that many company managements would probably agree that trade unionism is, in balance, a healthy condition, despite some of its short-term annoyances and costs.)

DP 000153

CONFIDENTIAL

But it should be noted that I specified organised opposition "within bounds". Organised opposition without certain restraining limits could become troublesome or even catastrophic to C.R.A.'s interest, and I think it should be recognised that the seeds of such opposition already exist, mainly in the form of the capabilities of some leaders to mobilize overt and latent hostility to C.R.A., and then either to gain support in Port Moresby by political means, or to focus unfavourable world opinion on Bougainville by means of the press. Something like a major mine disaster, killing several natives, could spark such a reaction, as could the expropriation of some large and heavily populated tract of land. More likely, however, is the possibility that some ambitious native leader will seize on some minor incident and utilize it opportunistically to advance his political ambitions - all, of course, under the banner of "Bougainville for Bougainvilleans", (or New Guinea for New Guineans if the matters were to be transferred to the wider Port Moresby stage).

And this last point raises the broader question of the future of T.P.N.G., or put more concretely, - To what degree, and at what rate, are political events throughout the Territory likely to affect C.R.A.'s operations on Bougainville?

Anyone who has visited Port Moresby, from pubs to University and from business offices to Konedobu, will agree that responses to this question are numerous and diverse. At one extreme is the comfortable assumption that "It can't happen here" (or its variant, "Independence will come so slowly and in such good order that nothing like Africa could possibly occur here"). At the other extreme is the alarmist and perhaps overly pessimistic response that "anything can happen here".

DP 000154

I need not go into all the evidence adduced by the respective proponents of these contrary estimates (C.R.A. management has undoubtedly heard it all), but what I do wish to emphasise is that political events throughout the Territory (and particularly those on Bougainville) could most seriously affect C.R.A.'s future operations, and therefore that it behooves C.R.A. to keep

CONFIDENTIAL

well informed about the trend of those events. Of course, the native segment of the Territory's population is not the only one to watch; Bougainville's missions are also an important factor (the plantation management much less so), but the native segment (especially of Bougainville itself) is undoubtedly the major factor viz a viz C.R.A..

And now before turning to an assessment of the information now available on which C.R.A. might plan its future actions in the "external relations" sphere, I should like to draw attention to a development that could have very decisive consequences for the whole C.R.A. enterprise on Bougainville. I refer to the Island's fast growing population, and the tendency this might have in complicating even further the Company's acquisition of land.

According to the Administration's "Preliminary Census" of 1966, the total indigenous population of Kieta District (Bougainville, Buka, etc.) was 71,762, which represents a rise of 17,035 over the number recorded by the D.D.A. for 1960. In other words, during the six years prior to 1967, the District's indigenous population rose at the rate of 3.8% per annum - a rise which such authorities as Dr. Scragg (Director of T.P.N.G. Department of Public Health) believe will increase for several decades before it levels out at 3%. (To comprehend the magnitude of this rise, it should be compared with those of such other places as U.S.A. (1.1%), India (2.5%) and Latin America (3%): data from Washington Post Service printed in a Melbourne newspaper of 2 August, 1968.)

To this statistic some visitors to Bougainville might be led to reply "But Bougainville has plenty of land; enough to support many times its present population". Bougainville does indeed have "A lot of land", most of it now unoccupied and apparently unused. But to anyone who has lived for long on Bougainville's plains and mountain slopes, the main reason that most "empty" land is not used is that it cannot be economically used in terms of the technology now practiced by or available to its native inhabitants. And even with some totally new technology - say, rice farming, Bougainville's land presents some very

DP 000155

CONFIDENTIAL

limiting boundaries to an economy based on agriculture - as a perusal of the C.S.I.R.O. Document: Land of Bougainville and Buka Islands (Land Research Series No. 20, Melbourne: 1967) will clearly demonstrate.

In other words, in view of the Island's rapidly increasing native population, and in terms of those natives' present land-use methods, the pressure on land will continue to increase. And great momentum is being added to this trend by the natives' very sharply increasing move into (mainly cocoa) cash-cropping.

DP 000156

CONFIDENTIAL

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DP 000156 ✓

CONFIDENTIAL

EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF C.R.A.: REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF PRESENT  
AND POTENTIAL SUPPLY OF INTELLIGENCE  
TO C.R.A.

If one accepts the assumption that politically consequential events throughout the Territory, and in Bougainville in particular, will affect C.R.A.'s operation to an increasing degree, then it behooves C.R.A. to keep itself informed of those events, including, of course, any signs that portend them. In this connection, then, the first question that arises is: How adequate is the information (i.e. intelligence) now available to C.R.A. respecting its present position and future prospects on Bougainville?

The impression I now have is that the intelligence in question now reaches C.R.A. management from a number of scattered sources, and in what appears to be a somewhat haphazard manner.

First of all, a certain amount of intelligence about external events on Bougainville (i.e. external to the operation of the mining operation itself) reaches the Panguna management more or less directly - from numerous personal contacts of their own (with missionaries, natives, planters, etc.), and from certain native staff workers as Severinus and Henry Moses.

Secondly, some other bits of intelligence have in the past gone directly to the Panguna management from such short-term visiting investigators as R.B. Dakeyue, G.E. Kearney, and R. Nayacakaluv.

Thirdly, there appears to be a regular flow of intelligence to the Panguna management from the D.D.C. Kieta, W. Brown.

There may be other regular sources of intelligence available directly to the Panguna management of which I am unaware, but I should like to comment on the three just listed.

To begin with, except for the more searching report of Nayacakaluv on land tenure in the region immediately adjacent to Panguna, most of the 'intelligence' in question is concerned with certain seemingly important political activities of certain conspicuously noteworthy native leaders (particularly those openly opposed to C.R.A.) Now if such reports are reliable (a question I shall return to later on) they undoubtedly have

DP 000157

CONFIDENTIAL

value for C.R.A. On the other hand, in my opinion they constitute only a small part of the kind of intelligence C.R.A. ought to be receiving about the social and political contexts of their present and future operations on the Island. Now and then, it is possible, a certain individual native might succeed in exerting revolutionary influence on events on the Island; but in societies like these the usual pattern is that individual leaders come and go, while the longer, more consistent trends of events can be discerned only by more intensive observations over longer periods of time. (For example, I would hold that an intensive, long-range study, say, of the Nagovisis' move into cash-cropping, and of their local village politics, would provide more useful intelligence to C.R.A., in the long-run, than any number of reports on Paul Lapun's latest pronouncements.)

A second comment one can make about C.R.A.'s present intelligence-acquiring procedures is that they are not systematic - indeed, how could they be so? As military and diplomatic officials well know, and as industrial and commercial executives are becoming increasingly aware, intelligence is a full-time function involving many steps - e.g. collection, evaluation, collation, etc. - and specialist personnel. Some Commanding Officers, Ambassadors and Company executives undoubtedly have the required brain power to direct their organization's intelligence operation (although they may not possess the requisite skills), but usually they have many other things to do and should not be required to perform this extra job (no more than they would normally be required to keep the organization's books).

Returning now to the question of the reliability of intelligence now reaching the Panguna management (as contrasted with its adequacy), I have the impression that it is very, very uneven in quality, (the nature of the conflicting reports concerning the famous Damen \$8,000 fund being a case in point.) Quite apart from the inevitable distortion that accompanies second-, third-, etc. hand reports, I strongly suspect that some of the information reaching Panguna management is either 'filtered' (to use an expression of one Administration official), or 'doctored', or even deliberately fabricated. I am quite sure that the Panguna management is well aware that such 'filtering', etc. goes on, but it cannot be expected to devote the time necessary to carry out the indispensable job of systematic evaluation.

(The following paragraphs are for "eyes-only" of C.R.A. management for reasons that will be obvious).

In my travels about Bougainville, I made a special effort to learn how Administration officers dealt with Intelligence that had direct or indirect connection with C.R.A. For the A.D.C.

DP 000158

CONFIDENTIAL

Kieta this is of course a major preoccupation, and I daresay he is conscientious and good at the job (at least, concerning day-to-day events); but the impression I gained elsewhere is pretty discouraging. As one official said: "Most Kiaps wouldn't recognise important intelligence if they saw it"; and I was told by more than one that 'all that stuff about native customs is all right for anthropologists, but I've got other things to do.' But I should like to illustrate my point by telling of an experience I had at Wakunai.

In answer to my questions, the A.D.O. Wakunai asserted that the natives in his sub-district were strongly pro-C.R.A., that at a recent Council they had voted "unanimously" ("except for a small minority"! ) to allow the Craestar-based helicopter to explore their area. (A subsequent episode witnessed at Asitavi indicated that some of the council members in question did not fully understand what they had "unanimously" agreed to - but that is a different story.) At this point in our discussion, a young Patrol Officer joined us and told of having met with some natives who were returning to their mountain homes from the Council meeting just mentioned. "They were unhappy about the decision," he reported; and he went on to say, "They told me that they were against the resolution; but since they hadn't been asked their opinions they kept silent." At which point I asked the Patrol Officer what had been the natives' reasons for their anti-C.R.A. sentiment, and he replied, "I really couldn't say; I didn't ask them." (!)

Turning now to the larger stage of the Territory as a whole, the question becomes: How adequate is the intelligence now available to C.R.A. respecting its future prospects in the Territory at large? Perhaps the simplest way to approach an answer to this question is to list and comment on the sources known to me.

Army Special Branch -      Sc: p2: ...

I must confess to total ignorance (and well I might!) of the operations and virtues of this shadowy organization. I was told by some individuals that they made a specialty of keeping the 'dubious academic types' under surveillance, and I observed with admiration how long one of its principal officers managed to stand upright at the Papua Hotel bar; but beyond that - nothing.

DP 000159

CONFIDENTIAL

Police Department -

I assume that the constabulary gather a certain amount of intelligence in connection with their activities; but again, I know nothing about it.

District Administration -

Undoubtedly a great deal of intelligence reaches this headquarters, and is read and pondered by the officials there. Much of it is probably good, and would be useful for C.R.A. to know; but most of it is subject to the inadequacies I described earlier, when discussing the D.A. intelligence operation on Bougainville. In other words, no matter how skillful and conscientious the D.A. headquarters officials may be in collating the reports received by them, the end product can be no better than the raw materials with which they have to work.

Department of Information and Extension Service -

A few experiences I had on Bougainville suggest to me that the field representatives of this organization may in some cases be better at some kinds of intelligence collecting than their peers in the D.A. They appear to travel extensively, seeking newsworthy information, and they are not normally identified with the less popular aspects of D.A. personnel.

See p 25 DISCUSSION...

It is my understanding that all the above branches of the Administration meet at three-monthly intervals (under the chairmanship of David Fernbury, of the Administrator's staff?) in order to compare notes and discuss the political mood of the Territory; but of course I have no way of knowing whether C.R.A.'s position is specifically considered at such meetings, or whether the proceedings thereof are made available to C.R.A.

In addition to the above official sources of Intelligence, there are of course the bits, of uneven quality, that could be gleaned from such sources as newspapers, mission officials, business men, etc., but I am under the impression that C.R.A. makes no systematic uses of these.

Finally, there are certain academic organizations that could provide much valuable intelligence to C.R.A. respecting its political prospects in the Territory as a whole; I am now aware that it is now being tapped by C.R.A. management.

DP 000160

CONFIDENTIAL

University of Papua-New Guinea -

This brand new but very promising University has on its faculty some individuals who are outstanding experts in the political life of New Guinea, including anthropologists, historians, and political scientists. Also, they are in the unique position of enjoying close relationships with many New Guinea indigenes who are probably exceptionally well informed about political trends in many parts of the Territory, and who - in the very nature of things - will eventually be leaders and opinion-makers in the Territory. Indeed, some prominent New Guinea politicians are already enrolled there.

As I said, the University faculty includes several experts on New Guinea, but for C.R.A.'s purposes the most outstanding individual among them is C.D. Rowley, Professor of Political Studies, whose book, 'The New Guinea Villager' (Melbourne: F.W. Cheshire, 1965) is the best book in print on modern science and political conditions in the Territory as a whole.

In this connection, one should of course not pass over the University's Vice-Chancellor, Dr. John Gunther, who in the broadest sense of the word is perhaps the best informed man in the world on New Guinea politics. As indeed, he should be: he was directly involved in it for decades, and combines his administratively privileged store of facts with a scholar's deep insights.

Australian National University -

The Institute of Advanced Studies of A.N.U. contains the world's largest collection of distinguished scholars concerned with New Guinea - historians, geographers, anthropologists, economists, demographers, political scientists, etc. Moreover, in Port Moresby there is established a branch of the University, the New Guinea Research Unit, that is concerned solely and comprehensively with research in the Territory. And not only do the professors, etc. of A.N.U. themselves engage in research in the Territory, but there is a continuous stream of their students carrying out investigations there.

I am of course aware that C.R.A. management is acquainted with some members of the University of P.-N.G. and of A.N.U., but I have the impression that no systematic use is being made by C.R.A. of these valuable sources of Intelligence. This is quite understandable, inasmuch as there does not appear to be any systematic and comprehensive undertaking on the part of the scholars themselves to provide a regular, up-to-date flow of information regarding the political moods and political trends of the Territory

DP 000161

CONFIDENTIAL

as a whole. There has already been published a very valuable account and diagnosis of the House of Assembly election of 1964 (Bettison, D.G.; Hughes, C.A.; van den Veur, P.W. 'The Papua-New Guinea Elections of 1964'. Canberra: A.N.U. Press, 1965; Ogan, Eugene, 'An Election in Bougainville', *Ethnology*, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1965), and a similar study is being prepared on the election of 1968 (publication date, about July, 1969), but my talks with scholars in Port Moresby and Canberra reveal that no effort is at present being made to engage them in a continuing assessment of the Territory's political situation. The skills for carrying out such an assessment are unquestionably available, in Australian Universities and in the University of Papua-New Guinea, but no plans are afoot to mobilize them for such an enterprise, which could be of immense importance not only to C.R.A. but to the Government of the Commonwealth as well.

In addition to the New Guinea specialists located in Australia and New Guinea, there are of course many others based elsewhere, including especially Canada and the United States. Reports by these scholars are appearing with increasing frequency, but as in the case of the Australia- and Port Moresby-based scholars, such reports normally concern only localized and topically specialized aspects of the Territory's politics, etc., and to the best of my knowledge no systematic effort is being made to pull these bits together into a comprehensive picture of the Territory's political situation.

DP 000162

CONFIDENTIAL

EXTERNAL RELATIVES OF C.R.A.: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A MORE  
SYSTEMATIC SUPPLY OF INTELLIGENCE  
TO C.R.A.

In view of the huge uncertainty that exists concerning the Territory's political future, it seems to me that C.R.A. will need to be as well informed as humanly possible concerning the rapidly changing political situation there - and not just concerning current, politically explicit events but concerning events and situations likely to have political consequences in the future. In other words, C.R.A. will need to know not only what happens in Port Moresby today, but also what is happening throughout the Territory that could influence what will happen in Port Moresby (and Canberra) tomorrow. Moreover, since events on Bougainville itself will undoubtedly exert a particularly powerful influence upon events in Port Moresby (and Canberra), special attention should be focused by C.R.A. on that Island's changing political situation.

Concerning Bougainville in Particular -

In my opinion two kinds of action are required to supplement present intelligence procedures on Bougainville, in order to provide C.R.A. with the kinds of information it needs for planning and conducting its operations on that Island. One action involves anthropological studies of areas adjacent to C.R.A.'s operations, and the other involves the employment of a man on Bougainville to collect and collate intelligence and to pass it on to C.R.A. management.

In my view the areas on Bougainville requiring deeper anthropological study (i.e. those most relevant to C.R.A.'s interests) are those parts of the Nasioi-speaking area comprising the North Nasioi, South Nasioi and Kongara census divisions; the Nagovisi and Baitisi census divisions; and the Rotokas-Aita Eivo census division. (A study is already nearly completed of Buka Island - i.e. that of the A.N.U. anthropologist, Max Rimoldi - and a report will be forthcoming within a year or so. And I myself have the intention of carrying out a restudy of the Sivai area, so that this area should become fairly well covered.

It will be noted that I have excluded the Guava census division from the areas of recommended study. I do so because of two considerations.

First of all, C.R.A. already possesses Dr. Nayacukaliv's valuable basic observations on that area, and because of its proximity to

DP 000163

CONFIDENTIAL

Panguna, current events in this area are likely to be under close scrutiny of Kiaps. And secondly, I feel that the people in the Guava census division are in some respects already a "lost cause" for C.R.A. Anti-C.R.A. sentiment in this area is probably about as strong as it can ever expect to be, and no further research is needed to trace the sources of it.

As for the three areas I am recommending for deeper study, no specific action is required on the part of C.R.A. Plans are made to send three of my students to these areas in the near future - a couple to Nagovisi-Saitsi, and a young man to Aita-Rotokas (the latter has already made a preliminary visit there). No financial or other assistance will be required of C.R.A. for these studies; in fact, the students in question will be able to pursue their investigations more satisfactorily without any evident connection with C.R.A.

As for the third of the areas recommended for study, the North and South Nasioi and Kongara census divisions, there will soon be available Eugene Ogan's report on that area, and the parts of it I have already seen indicate that it will provide an exceptionally useful description and diagnosis of the current situation in that area. As for keeping this picture up to date, I shall undertake to persuade Ogan to carry out periodic re-studies of that area, and to arrange independent financing for same.

My second recommendation concerning C.R.A.'s intelligence procedures on Bougainville involves the employment of a man to be stationed on the Island, one whose main job will be to collect, evaluate and collate intelligence and pass it on to C.R.A. management. Such an individual would also assist management in planning its external relations programme, but he would not be involved in implementing it.

I have fairly strong convictions about the kind of skills this man ought to possess, but I have not been able to decide who he should be. An ideal type of man for the job would be one with some anthropological training, with investigatory skills, with enough experience in the Territory to provide him with background knowledge and perspective but not such that would have biased his views, and with the kind of personality that would permit him access to all kinds of people - from D.C. and R.C. Bishops to native villagers. Admittedly, not an easy job slot to fill.

I would not recommend employing a professional anthropologist for this position: all those likely to have the desired qualifications would probably have no interest in

DP 000164

CONFIDENTIAL

a second-rate anthropologist could be worse than none at all. It could be that some ex-D.A. officer would have the desired qualifications, but here one faces the risk that such an individual will have developed some of the biases and dogmatics almost inevitably associated with those D.A. officers who have been successful as such. (Long exercise of the kind of authority usually possessed by D.A. field personnel seems almost inevitably to affect a man's views of himself and his 'subjects'.)

(I do have one or two possible candidates for the job in question, but prefer to discuss them verbally, for obvious reasons.)

In any case, whomever is chosen for this hypothetical job should, in my opinion, report his findings to C.R.A. management at Panguna, but he should not be supervised directly by Panguna. In other words, he should in general be responsible to top C.R.A. management in Melbourne, and should co-operate closely with the C.R.A. intelligence man stationed in Port Moresby (see below). Also, it would probably be preferable for the Bougainville intelligence man to be based in at Kieta, rather than at the mine's Panguna offices (or in the proposed mine town). Some kind of "cover" for him might possibly be useful, but I can think of none that would be entirely feasible, or credible. I suggest therefore that though he not attempt to hide the fact that he is employed by C.R.A., he should not advertise it unduly.

#### Concerning the Territory as a whole -

I recommend that two kinds of action be taken in order to provide C.R.A. with more systematic and regular information relevant to its current and future situation in the Territory as a whole; first, a mobilization of relevant scholarly resources; and secondly, the appointment of an agent to be based in Port Moresby.

As noted earlier, there exist in A.N.U., in the U.P.-N.G., and in other Australian universities a formidable array of outstanding experts on all phases of New Guinea life; but these resources are largely untapped with respect to C.R.A.'s interests - i.e. with respect to providing a comprehensive, up-to-date picture of politically relevant events in the Territory that do or could affect C.R.A.'s operations there. Some joint undertakings have been undertaken in the past, as, e.g. the studies of the House of Assembly elections of 1964 and 1968, but most of the individuals engaged in studying New Guinea do so separately, independently, and without apparent concern for the larger Territory-wide picture.

DP 000165

CONFIDENTIAL

While in Canberra I raised this issue with several staff members there, including the Vice-Chancellor, Sir John Crawford, and the Director of the School of Pacific Studies, Prof. Oscar Spate. Specifically, I proposed to them the establishment of a permanent seminar-like unit which would have as its objective the continuing study of the Territory's political condition (and of economic, demographic, etc. situations affecting politics) in a comprehensive and systematic way. And not merely learned discussions of these matters, but frequent and rapidly distributed reports about them. Also, although the centre of the unit would be in Canberra, it would include members from universities, etc. elsewhere. Such a unit should of course not be left to run itself; it would require a secretariat consisting of permanent staff members whose whole energies would be devoted to this very large-scale and important enterprise.

I can state that I met with a good response to my proposal from all persons encountered, and the Vice-Chancellor specifically authorized me to report that he would lend his support to the undertaking, if some assistance in staffing the secretariat could be found elsewhere. (in this connection, I have some suggestions to offer concerning possible candidates for the staff secretariat positions, but would prefer to discuss these verbally.) //

My second recommendation concerning C.R.A.'s intelligence activities in the Territory as a whole involves the appointment of a representative to be based in Port Moresby. Such an individual would travel rather widely around the Territory (including regular trips to Bougainville) and to Canberra as well. His job would be to maintain systematic contacts with all major sources of information - including Administrative officers, native leaders, mission officials, journalists, knowledgeable business men, and scholars (including particularly the Canberra-based unit proposed above.) He would not only collect, evaluate, and collate such information, but he would also attempt to promote its collection from sources previously untapped.

While the principal job of this representative would be to collect, etc. intelligence for C.R.A. management, he would also assist management in planning programs aimed at improving its external relations in the Territory. He might also now and then undertake, through his personal contacts, to help promote measures of potential value to C.R.A. (including, e.g. reforms in school syllabuses aimed at educating natives more specifically about the economic realities of "Independence.")

I do not have to point out that such a job will require a man combining several attributes:

DP 000166

CONFIDENTIAL

a considerable experience in the Territory, but one that has not resulted in strong biases of one kind or another - either pro- or anti-Administration, mission, commerce, etc.; intellectual qualities and interests that would render him sensitive to a wide range of information on the Territory - from anthropological tribal studies to economic analyses; and personal characteristics that would gain him access to a wide range of information sources, from top Administrative officials and native Assembly members, to university scholars.

Again, I have some suggestions about possible candidates for such a position, but prefer to discuss them verbally. //

DP 000167

CONFIDENTIAL

EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF C.R.A. : PLANNING

Obviously, C.R.A. will not be interested in gathering intelligence relative to its enterprise merely for sake of knowing - i.e. to be useful such intelligence will have to be applied to planning programs aimed at maintaining C.R.A.'s autonomy and investment security in the Territory's rapidly changing polity. But assuming that adequate intelligence will be available for such planning, I venture to recommend (even at the risk of calling attention to the obvious) that C.R.A. proceed more systematically than before in planning its external relations programs.

I am much impressed with the care and skill with which engineers plan such projects as, say, bridge-building - or even the technical side of copper mining! I cannot imagine that such planning is left to ad hoc 'inspiration', or that later stages of construction are carried out mainly in reaction to crises (although a certain amount of flexibility must necessarily be built into the planning, in order to react to unforeseen crises). On the other hand some engineers I know (present company excepted!) seem to believe that human relations in general and human reactions in particular require no such overall planning - or that they are so unpredictable as to render planning useless.

As you will have inferred, I do not share in this latter view. While it is possibly true that human relations involve even more variables than, say, copper mining, they are susceptible to some measure of prediction, and even of control; and programs aimed at influencing them, or of reacting promptly to them, should be as carefully and comprehensively planned as the mining of copper itself.

As is well known, C.R.A. has already embarked upon a series of measures aimed at influencing its Bougainville neighbours to look upon the Company with favour - scholarships, medical aid, trips to Australian mines, grants to missions, etc. And most of the measures appear to me to have been hit upon in rather haphazard, hit-or-miss, inspiration-of-the-moment ways. Now, while some of these measures may truly have achieved

DP 000168

CONFIDENTIAL

their objectives, others have most definitely not done so planned; in fact some of C.R.A.'s most (seemingly) altruistic actions may have produced negative results.

What I wish to suggest is that C.R.A. apply to the planning of its external human relations the same kind of "engineering" principles that it applies to developing a mine - i.e. a plan that sets up a set of priorities and one that involves the consideration of cost compared with possible profit.

With regard to priorities, I suggest (for example) that more immediate profits would derive from help to the Boro Valley natives in completing their road (where with to transport cocoa to market) than from scholarships given to natives (the returns from which will be much larger in coming, and may never be forthcoming at all).

And with regards to cost, I must assume that the resources (in hard cash and in staff time) that will be available for external relations purposes will be fairly limited, so that they should be carefully allocated, in terms of expected profits therefrom. For example, however, favourable an impression might be made upon an individual sent at Company's expense on a trip to Australia, a larger cumulative profit might derive from bringing ten individuals to Panguna, at the same cost, for a well planned, well fed visit.

Again, in all such planning, careful thought should be given to the possible consequences of any measure under consideration before it is put into operation. Take, for example, the matter of scholarships to Australia. It is quite possible that some of the recipients of such scholarships will behave as hoped - i.e., they will dutifully carry out their studies and return home to become valuable and grateful employees of the Company. But a great deal of case studies in comparable situations indicate that many such recipients will not return home at all, or will have undergone experiences abroad that serve to make them dangerously hostile to their benefactors. Or, to take another hypothetical case, a road built and then not perfectly maintained might result in long-term dissatisfactions that would more than offset any initial

DP 000169

CONFIDENTIAL

gains in public favour. Or as a final example, a medical aid program that is not continued might be worse, in terms of the Company's interests, than no medical aid at all.

(The following is for "eyes only" of C.R.A.)

To give an example of the possible consequences of acting without consideration of consequences, I should like to describe an actual case. The action itself was not by C.R.A., and it involved no dollar outlay, but it could have most unfavourable consequences for C.R.A.

A few weeks ago, during one of his periodic news-collecting excursions into the hill villages, a representative of Radio Bougainville tape-recorded a remarkable little ditty that had been recently composed by some native living near Panguna and was being sung by the village women. A translation of it goes as follows :-

The Machinery thunders and echoes at Pankiranku,  
(a hill behind Panguna)  
The Company gets police to defend it,  
Police! You can kill me with your batons,  
C.R.A.! You have taken Panguna for your  
homeland, Australia,  
I am the real owner - my ancestors gave me this  
land,  
You did not think of me, you stole my hunting  
grounds,  
When you did this, you thought I was a fool who  
knew nothing,  
But do you know what I think of you?  
I think you are a thief. I think you stole  
my land.

Whatever one may think of its poetic merits it is a vivid expression of at least some aspects of local sentiment concerning C.R.A.

DP 000170

In any case, the Administration authorities at Kieta took one horrified look at this ditty and forthwith banned its broadcast (which the radio man was evidently intending to do, in connection with his program on native folk-music). As one of the

CONFIDENTIAL

authorities explained to me, "We can't let stuff like that be broadcast; it would be most harmful to C.R.A., and might suggest to people that the Administration was against C.R.A."

Longer and better informed consideration of the matter would, in my opinion, have led to a different decision, and for at least two reasons :-

- (i) Knowledge of the ditty will have spread even without the broadcast; in fact I strongly suspect that it is being sung over large areas of Bougainville by now, and the decision to ban its broadcast (the original singers whose performance was recorded know that it was intended for broadcast), will inevitable lead to the (correct) conclusion that anti-C.R.A. sentiment is being systematically suppressed.
- (ii) In my judgement it would be to C.R.A.'s long-term advantage if the natives could be led to believe that the Administration is not too closely identified with C.R.A. in all respects.

DP 000171

As the reader will doubtless recognise some of the kind of thinking that should go into planning C.R.A.'s external relations program comes under the heading of "good common sense". But an important ingredient of such thinking needs to be informed by the kind of information about Bougainville natives which only anthropologists can provide. While it is true that in many important respects, all human beings are alike; and while it is equally true that no two humans are exactly alike; it is just as true (and just as often overlooked) that people sharing the same language and culture (such as the Nasioi, in contrast to Anglo-Australo-Americans) differ from those of other cultures in many profound respects, despite superficial resemblances. (According to my judgement, when an American manager or diplomat in, say, an African setting recovers from the initial reaction of "How different the natives are from us", and begins to believe that "Really basically they are just like ourselves", he is ready to be transferred; for although he may make some friendly acquaintances among his native neighbours, he is no longer competent to make crucial decisions.

CONFIDENTIAL

Planning is of course not a one-time operation; it should be reviewed and if necessary revised periodically, and left flexible enough to adjust to unexpected events. Moreover, it goes without saying that planning will be particularly important during the earliest stage of the C.R.A. operation, after the decision has been made to proceed with mining. As for the composition of the body doing this planning, I suggest that it include the two C.R.A. agents recommended earlier (those stationed at Kieta and at Port Moresby). An anthropologist familiar with Bougainville would also be useful (by which time there should be three or four such available), but I suggest that an Administration representative not be brought into the discussion until the C.R.A. officers and their consultants have themselves decided on the actions they wish to take. And finally, after a plan of operations concerning the Company's external relations has been defined in major outline, it may be advisable and useful to engage some native leaders in the final working out of details.

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DP 000172

CONFIDENTIAL

EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF C.R.A. : IMPLEMENTATION

In this section I should like to record some general suggestions that relate to the implementation of any program of external relations that may be devised.

First of all, I strongly recommend that when C.R.A. decides what actions affecting its external relations have to be taken in order to proceed with mining, that those actions be announced and widely publicized, all at the same time. The initial shock will understandably be severe to the natives directly affected by those actions, but the much larger numbers of natives not to be directly affected will be able to quieten their fears. (For example, if the message is made sufficiently clear and reassuring, natives in, say, Buin, will no longer be thrown into anxiety when a helicopter flies overhead.) Rumors will of course continue to circulate for a long time thereafter, but without any substance to back them they should eventually die.

Secondly, it hardly needs saying that C.R.A. officers should be scrupulously careful in their statements about 'what C.R.A. might do' on behalf of natives. As noted earlier, to all the Bougainville natives I know, a European's 'promises' (or statements taken to mean such) are more or less "official", and are taken either to have the binding force of a written contract - or are interpreted to be deliberate 'gammon'.

Thirdly, it is important to restate that if C.R.A. starts any measure designed (and interpreted) to assist natives, it should complete it.

DP 000173

CONFIDENTIAL

And, finally, I wish to suggest that it might, in the long-run, serve C.R.A.'s purposes better if some of the measures thought promising of better external relations, were to be carried out by the Administration, even if financed by C.R.A. itself. My reason for saying this is as follows.

Some natives are bound to remain or become anti-C.R.A. for a long time to come. If they are given the impression that C.R.A. and Administration are closely united, then they are quite likely to broaden their hostility and become generally anti-European - with some potentially very dangerous consequences. On the other hand, if those natives unfriendly to C.R.A. were given some evidence that the Administration, at least, is not in the enemy camp, they are more likely to air their anti-C.R.A. sentiments in the open, and not be driven "underground".

In this sense, when evidence becomes visible that C.R.A. taxes are being spent by the Administration in, say, improving natives' roads, the long-term advantages to C.R.A. would perhaps be greater than if C.R.A. built the road itself. (Also, such an eventuality would serve far better than any amount of publicity, to educate natives in the economics of politics.)

DP 000174

CONFIDENTIAL

#### EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF CRA : SOME SPECIFICS

In concluding this lengthy report on CRA's external relations, I should like to record some brief comments on a number of specific topics relating to those relations.

##### Bougainville Copper Bulletin

In my travels about the Island I found this periodical receiving a wide variety of reactions. In the Guava division itself it was deliberately ignored by most people I met (including the best educated of them, the teachers and catechists); to all such individuals it was "gammon". In Sivai and Western Nagovisi it appears to have been read by a few persons, but ignored by others, and around Wakunai and Buka Passage, I found some natives who read it, others who were indifferent to it, and many others who had never heard of it.

In shaping its editorial policy I suggest that more local interest might attach to it if it focussed less on CRA and more on non-CRA natives and affairs (including some local folk-lore, and photos of local councillors).

##### Radio Bougainville

I was impressed by the widespread attention devoted to this station's broadcasts. And the fact that broadcasting is limited to the evening hours serves if anything to dispose people to listen in. (A day-long broadcast would, I suspect, inevitably become a bore.)

##### Overt Publicity Campaigns

In the present mood of many Bougainville natives, I suspect that any overt publicity carried out by CRA - e.g. travelling movies, talks to Councils, etc. - would produce more resentment than goodwill. In connection with this and similar "goodwill" measures, I suggest that better results would be secured by providing the natives with opportunities to learn about CRA but leaving them to their own devices.

DP 000175

CONFIDENTIAL

### Sightseeing

Turning to another kind of "travelling", to the excursions made by CRA personnel, European and native (especially "Redskins"), in search of exercise, views, native curios, and other forms of diversion, even if such excursions are innocent and well intentioned they can produce some undesirable reactions among the villagers visited by them. Such reactions range from mild annoyance against intrusions of privacy and trespass, to genuine anxieties in the face of supposed threats to their women and to their land. I sympathize fully with the CRA employees who wish to break out of the confines of Panguna and see some of the native life. Indeed, CRA would be fortunate (in some respects) if more of its employees possessed the intellectual qualities that moved them to explore their surroundings. But I also sympathize with the natives visited; they also have their rights of privacy, and their fears for their women and their land are well founded.

I cannot suggest how CRA should deal with this problem in external relations - a problem that will inevitably increase - and mention it only as a reminder that it exists.

DP 000176

### Medical Aid

The question of whether or not to take medical aid to natives is a complex one. (I am of course discussing this question in relation to CRA's enterprise, and not in terms of broader moral issues.) There may well be instances in which a visit by a CRA medical assistant to a distant village makes some new friends for the Company. But just as often, I suspect, such services are expected as a matter of course (viz. my notion of native "dependency"), or are contemptuously considered to be "grease", or are anxiously feared to be prologues to some future demand for reciprocity. Also, such visits, if eventually terminated, could result in more dissatisfaction, over the long-run, than if they were never begun.

These several considerations lead me to suggest that in future CRA should not widen its medical aid visits to other areas, but rather encourage natives to bring their medical problems to the Panguna hospital. Among other things (including

--- we want to see if we can change CRA with "grease".

CONFIDENTIAL

#### Road building

Some Administrative officials stated to me that CRA's best bet for gaining native acceptance would be by constructing a few strategically located roads, while others complained that all such efforts would be looked upon as "grease" and that no advantages would accrue to CRA from such measures.

There is indeed a crying need for roads throughout the Island, and no single thing that could be done would be greeted with more widespread satisfaction. On the other hand, whether any of that satisfaction would rub off onto CRA is a matter that would require a great deal of investigation; and road-building is after all a very costly thing.

#### Land Acquisition

In view of Bougainville natives' attitudes toward their land it would behoove CRA, wherever possible, to acquire it by lease rather than by purchase. Even if the lease were very long term, its native owner could take comfort in the prospect of its eventual return - if not to himself, then at least to his heirs.

#### Trade Store

I can think of no single measure that CRA could undertake that would produce such quick (and perhaps such uncostly) good-will profits as a large, well stocked, and easily accessible trade store. The Project has everything to recommend it. It will attract more and more local natives to Panguna, and thus possibly help to break down barriers of hostility. It will provide them with things to buy with their money, and thus possibly increase their willingness to work for or sell to CRA. And, quite apart from any advantage accruing to CRA, it will provide natives with more and better goods. (Nor, in my visits to Kieta's Chinatown, did I hear any store-keepers complain about "unfair competition", even when I raised the question point-blank.)

DP 000177

The possible lay-out of such a store warrants some consideration. To begin with I feel that it should be quite large and very well stocked. In addition, I strongly recommend that it be arranged on the

CONFIDENTIAL

accustomed to standing before a counter and choosing a distant object from a sales clerk, the opportunity to choose their own purchases would be a wondrous new experience. For Europeans who know all about things from their brandnames it may be less important; but to most natives it would be a very gratifying experience to see things close-to, to touch them or heft them, to compare them with other things of similar kind, and to do all this without being hurried in their decisions by a more or less impatient sales clerk.

The reaction one gets from some Europeans to the idea of an open-shelf supermarket type store at Panguna is that the native customers would soon and inevitably steal the place blind. And perhaps "natives" in some parts of the world would do so. But to test this assumption about New Guinea natives I visited several open-shelf stores at Buka Passage and Rabaul (including Carpenter's, Steamship Trading Co., and Burns Philp), and put the question to their managers. Without exception they answered to the following effect :-

When open-shelf buying was first introduced there was indeed some stealing (as much by Europeans as by natives!) but in time shop-lifting dropped away to a small trickle. All one needs is a little surveillance, which can usually be exercised at the check-out counters.

I did not systematically enquire about the results of open-shelf selling upon volume of sales, but the one storekeeper who mentioned the subject, the manager of Rabaul's Steamship Trading Co. Store, stated that sales in his store had indeed increased, as result of "impulse buying".

DP 000178

Finally, I suggest that something more than perfunctory attention should be devoted to the selection of merchandise for such a store. It will of course stock the usual trade store line of calico, blankets, lanterns, tobacco, soap, rice, beef, etc.; but in addition such a store could serve a very useful purpose by providing its native customers with items not regularly sold in trade stores - items that could help to raise native standards of living in ways not presently open to them. I refer, e.g. to tools specifically adopted to New Guinea conditions and tool-using habits; to low price, sewing-machines; to fool-proof low-cost lighting systems; to insect-proof

CONFIDENTIAL

food-safes; to appropriate educational toys; and such like. Selection of such items will require a great deal of imaginative research, and possibly some new inventions or adaptations.

I am not proposing that CRA go into the business of inventing and manufacturing such goods, but I have discovered that a lot of thought has been devoted to the devising of consumer goods, tools, and appliances specifically adapted to certain low-income "native" populations - by organisations like the South Pacific Commission, and by departments of education, home economics, and agricultural extension in various tropical natives and dependencies. Search for such models might well be referred to the Territory's Administration; it is a project which the Administration ought to be doing, since it would have applications much wider than CRA's trade store. (I did in fact raise the matter in a conversation with officials of the Department of Education, who showed interest in it, but advised me that nothing systematic had been done about it thus far.)

DP 000179

#### CRA and Education

In my travels about Bougainville, and more specifically in Port Moresby, I endeavoured to discover whether there was anything in the Territory's educational programmes that would serve, indirectly, to dispose natives favourably or otherwise to CRA-like enterprises in the Territory. It occurred to me, for example, that instruction that would feature the study of the economics of nation-hood in general, or of the recent histories of developing nations in particular, might serve to demonstrate to students that real political independence requires economic independence as well, and that economic independence requires capital and highly skilled technicians, etc.

The results of my enquiries were discouraging. The native teachers I queried did not even comprehend what I was asking about, and a perusal of official syllabi (see accompanying documents), supplemented by a discussion with the Territory's Director of Education, leads me to the conclusion that CRA cannot expect much progress in this matter for a very long time to come.

As for the larger question, whether the increasing

...attitudes towards CRA, however  
offer any better answer than  
a guess? Unlikely indeed.  
...and so on.

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 6 p.03  
52 - also no  
part of

CRA Townsite

The size and location of the proposed CRA employees' town is a matter having many serious implications for the Company's "external relations", but I will raise these in the next section of this report.

DP 000180

CONFIDENTIAL

### THE BOUGAINVILLE TOWN

I recommend that the proposed C.R.A. mining town on Bougainville be located on high ground in the immediate vicinity of the mine, and that it be fragmented into about five separate residential neighbourhoods of multiple-unit composition. My recommendation is based upon consideration of the Company's external relations and of the overall efficiency of its own work force. Although the initial dollar cost of this plan, relative to the initial cost of one for a town built near the coast has not been estimated, and may well be higher, I predict that over the long run the former will be lower in cost because of such factors as transport between residences and mine site and perhaps more significantly of overall labour costs. }

If the town is to be built on the higher ground around Panguna then its fragmentation will perhaps be inescapable, but in my opinion a fragmented town will be preferable to a unified one wherever it might be located.

#### I. Factors Concerning External Relations

In my judgement the Company will gain more - or lose less - good will among its indigenous neighbours by locating its town near the mine, for the following reasons :

Land Acquisition. Wherever land is to be acquired from native owners it will arouse opposition, but in my opinion acquisition of more land around Panguna will arouse less new opposition than land acquired elsewhere. In some respects most villagers around Panguna are already so strongly anti-C.R.A. that further encroachments upon their land cannot make them much more so. Moreover, it is my impression that the losses that would be suffered by the land owners around Panguna would be more psychological than economical, in view of the nature of the terrain and the soil there.

In this connection, locating the town at Pakia Village seems to me particularly inadvisable. Not only would such a move constitute a second

DP 000181

CONFIDENTIAL

dislocation for most of its residents but the land there is considerably more valuable in terms of native agriculture than the land around Panguna. And although the natives of Pakia are certainly not pro-C.R.A. at present there is perhaps a better prospect of winning their good will, by not disturbing them further, than would be the case, with the natives around Panguna. And in any case, more natives would have to be dislocated in Pakia than around Panguna itself. (Incidentally, I have been advised by R. Hoad, Patrol Officer at Boku, that the proposed site for C.R.A.'s waste disposals in the Jaba-Mariropa area, would dislocate only about 20-30 natives.)

Relative Isolation. I think it can be an accepted working assumption that direct or uncontrolled contacts between C.R.A. personnel (Europeans, Asian, "Red Skins", and non-local Bougainvilleans) and local Bougainvilleans are going to result in incidents detrimental to C.R.A.'s external relations interest. - especially in view of the fact that many of the C.R.A. employees will be unattached males. This is not to deny that some good results will come from such contacts, but I predict that the good will be outbalanced by the bad, at least during the first decade of the enterprise. (I should stress here that I am now discussing uncontrolled contact, i.e., to meetings between C.R.A. aliens and local natives in, say, bars, villages, etc., outside the Company's jurisdiction.) Thus, a township in the relatively isolated, sparsely populated area around Panguna would offer less opportunity for uncontrolled contacts between C.R.A. personnel and local natives.

On the one hand, there would be less opportunities for direct contact between natives and C.R.A. employees during the latter's time off, not only at the end of working days but during the longer free time periods as well.

In connection with the latter, if C.R.A. were to build its town site near Panguna, I am assuming that the Company will also construct a recreation area for its employees at some place on the coast. And in this case I would predict that most C.R.A. employees would spend more of their longer free time periods at such a resort - which, again, would be

DP 000182

CONFIDENTIAL

within the Company's own jurisdiction, and relatively less time in forays into "uncontrolled" areas such as Kieta and native villages.

Another advantage in a town site relatively isolated from more densely populated native areas is that it would be subject to fewer visits by natives, including curiosity seekers, potential thieves, store customers and hospital patients. (I assume that C.R.A. does not wish to build a larger than necessary public hospital, nor operate a store in direct competition with the privately owned coastal stores.) I imagine that C.R.A. will wish to have its store, hospital, cinema, etc., serve the native population around Panguna itself (as partial compensation, at least, for the latter's irreplaceable loss in land and privacy) but that is a far cry from having to provide an emporium, etc., for most of east central Bougainville.

## II. Factors Concerning Internal Relations

High Versus Low Elevation. Climatic conditions alone seem to me to recommend siting the C.R.A. town on higher ground - advantages in terms of more work output and higher employee morale (which itself contributes to more work output). In connection with work output, I suggest that employees will work longer and harder hours, and that during their off hours will devote more time to outside exercise, and less to the pub, than would be the case in a higher-temperature site nearer the coast. And in connection with higher morale I feel certain that a cooler climate will make for better family life (healthier children, less fatigued wives, etc.) and for less of the kind of segregated existence that goes on in many air-conditioned, cell-like tropical Company and Military towns.

With respect to the above, I also suggest that any initial higher dollar costs involved in the actual construction of a higher-ground town would probably be offset in the long run by the savings resulting from a more efficient and more stable work force.

DP 000183

CONFIDENTIAL

Fragmented Versus Unified Town. And now I should like to list my reasons for favouring a fragmented over a unified Company town, quite apart from the consideration that fragmentation would probably be necessary if the town were to be built in the more rugged terrain around Panguna.

In the first place, in a single unified residential town comprising some 7,000-8,000 persons it would be next to impossible to accomplish the kind of "integration" desired by C.R.A., especially in view of the ethnic variation involved.

A great deal of sociological study indicates fairly clearly that any population aggregate containing more than about 1,500-1,700 persons will inevitably split up into smaller separate units, each with its own sense of common purpose, of "community". (It would thus seem that the human animal is simply not capable of maintaining positive face-to-face relations with numbers larger than those specified.)

In view of these numerical limits, any aggregate larger than 1,500-1,700 persons is going to split up in one of two ways, either "vertically" or "horizontally". By "vertical" fragmentation I mean stratification on some basis or other: race, religion, occupation, income, education, etc. And by "horizontal" I mean fragmentation on a spatial basis, such as neighbourhoods, precincts, parishes, etc.

Now some vertical stratification (probably based on race and income) is going to develop in C.R.A.'s town regardless of distance between dwellings, in spite of anything done to discourage it; but I believe that it can be minimised by the creation of, say, five geographically separate neighbourhoods each comprising some 1,600 persons of all ethnic and income categories.

DP 000184

As I envisage such a plan, each neighbourhood would contain certain common facilities, such as a playground, a small sports field and a canteen; in addition to which there would be a centre, separate from all the neighbourhoods, but located centrally to them, containing a larger store, a cinema, a hospital and perhaps a larger sports field.

CONFIDENTIAL


Geography alone should serve somewhat to encourage a sense of "community" in each of these separate neighbourhoods, but the Company could assist this process along by fostering neighbourhood competition between athletic teams, choral societies, dress-making clubs, etc. If rivalries are going to develop in the C.R.A. town, which they undoubtedly will do, how much better that it be between whole neighbourhoods consisting of all races, etc., than between, say, Europeans and indigenes, or Black Skins and Red Skins.

As neighbourhoods develop into communities they are also, inevitably, going to develop internal social structures of their own. And in view of the Company's commitment to integration and ethnic replacement some encouragement will probably have to be applied to ensure that their leadership in local neighbourhood affairs does not accumulate, by default, in European hands.


Multiple Versus Single Dwelling Units. Quite apart from factors of cost (including space) I suggest that multiple-unit dwellings would serve to promote the Company's integration objectives better than an assortment of single-unit than multi-unit would do. What I envisage for each neighbourhood is a number of two to three storey buildings, all looking more or less alike in their exterior, but, of course, divided differently inside as is shown, for example, on the following plan :

DP 000185


CONFIDENTIAL




- A. Executives and senior staff  
Two separate 2-storey flats.




- B. Middle-grade employees (married)  
Four separate (smaller) 2-storey flats.



- C. Middle-grade employees (single)  
Six separate 1-storey flats.



- D. Lower-grade employees (married)  
Six or eight separate 1-storey flats.



common room

bathroom

- E. Lower-grade employees (single)  
Sixteen or so separate bedrooms and  
a common bathroom and 'common' room.  
(Presumably, there would be a separate  
kitchen and mess hall for all single  
men of this grade in the neighbourhood.)

DP 000186

CONFIDENTIAL

For those persons subscribing to the "Every Man His Own Castle" school of thought - at least with respect to families, - I suggest that well-insulated walls between separate family units can and have been built. And, many multiple-flat buildings provide separate yard space for each flat.

There seem to be at least two positive social advantages to be gained from such a plan (in addition to advantages deriving from cost and space economy) :

- A building housing families of different races should provide more opportunities for them to "integrate", without actually forcing them to do so.
- If all such buildings were to look more or less alike in external features (e.g., size, shape, finish) they will occasion fewer invidious comparisons (and especially by those expert comparers, the wives!).

The Architecture and Furnishing of Residences.

In view of the Company's proposed manning schedule there would appear to be what might be called major "cultural" problems involved in two kinds of dwellings :

- in units designed initially for indigenous families; and
- in units designed initially for expatriate families, into which indigenes will move within the first decade or so of operation. (I am assuming that after a decade or so of operation, those indigenes who move into residences previously occupied by expatriates will have become sufficiently westernised in their living habits to adjust to western-type residences with some ease.)

I am not well enough informed to provide any specific plans for the interior structure and furnishings of those problem-type residences.

DP 000187

CONFIDENTIAL

but I should like to record some of the things that should be taken into consideration when drawing up such plans :

1. Needless to say Melanesians in general, and Bougainville natives in particular, differ radically from Europeans in the structure of their residences and in the use they make of them. For example, few of them either cook, eat or socialise inside their houses. Indeed, in many areas none but the closest of relatives are welcome inside a native house - the place where people sleep. In other words, in planning family houses initially for fairly early occupation by indigenes, provision should be made for the occupants to do part of their living outdoors.
2. Another very important consideration concerns Melanesian women. In most cases that I know of, the wife of a more-or-less Westernised Melanesian will be significantly less west-rnised than her husband, especially in terms of home-living habits - of ways of cooking and eating, of using western appliances, of entertaining visitors, etc. (In fact, I predict that not only in this respect but in most others as well, indigenous males will become "integrated" more easily and sooner than will their wives.)

In this connection, in the case of several marriages I know about involving a European man and a New Guinea wife, the latter either remains awkwardly separate from her husband's style of living (more servant than wife), or becomes so thoroughly European as to demand indigenous servants of her own.

And, in fact I predict that the wives living in the C.R.A. town will present problems to C.R.A. management in more respects than one. Relieved as they will be of their garden work and other chores of village life, they will have much mischief-inviting time on their hands unless a substitute activity is provided for them - e.g., sewing classes, English lessons, etc. Also I hardly need to point out that some of them will almost certainly become trouble-centres

DP 000188

CONFIDENTIAL

in a town population containing so many unattached males and so far removed from the usual social controls of village life.

3. Another problem involved in planning dwellings for indigenous families is what might be labelled "The Problem of Permanent Visitors". There are few things more certain than that many of the houses provided by C.R.A. for indigenous families will be more or less permanently crowded by numbers of "visiting" relatives. In other words if C.R.A. wishes to avoid this situation (and I suggest that it should do so in so far as possible), rules governing house occupancy ought to be promulgated at the very start.

As far as I have been able to discover there is no precedent in the Territory for solving the kind of housing problem faced by C.R.A. on Bougainville. A visit to government and privately built houses intended mainly for indigenes, in Rabaul and Port Moresby, revealed no particular concern that the peculiarities of indigenous living habits (except, perhaps, in the small sizes and shoddy construction of most such houses). And a tour of new housing developments in Port Moresby revealed that the recently announced housing proto-types, intended for either expatriates or indigenes, was wholly "expatriate" in interior design and furnishings.

A possible precedent might be found in Fiji, where the South Pacific Sugar Mills Company was recently working on a scheme to provide housing for their industrial workers; however, I know of no published reports dealing with this scheme.

I have also reviewed the literature from Africa in respect to C.R.A.'s Bougainville plan, but have found nothing of direct interest. There are, however, 2 African situations that seem to bear close parallels to that on Bougainville; I know of no published descriptions of these but they seem to be similar enough to warrant closer investigation; the mining enterprise in Zambia and the Kilembe mine in Western Uganda.

DP 000189

According to information received from Mr. N. D. Oram (A.N.U.) the Kilembe mine would appear to

CONFIDENTIAL

offer parallels strikingly similar to Bougainville, namely:

- both mines are located in remote areas;
- the local people have had no previous experience in industrial development;
- both are copper mines;
- both managements have had to face the decision whether to build their township on uneven terrain near the mining operation or on flat land near lake or sea (Kilembe chose the hills);
- both mines have had to import European miners from outside the Territory.

Since Kilembe is associated with Rio Tinto there would seem to be no difficulty about obtaining information about it.

(The aforesaid Mr. Oram, an expert on native housing and urbanism, has had very wide experience in these matters in Africa and is now a member of the New Guinea Research Unit in A.N.U.. Incidentally, Mr. Oram confirmed my own conclusion, saying "in most of the literature which I have collected on housing, etc., I could find little which is really relevant to the Bougainville problem".)  
(personal communication)

Finally I should like to draw attention to the housing situation among the Tolai living in and around Rabaul. While their situation is not entirely parallel to the Bougainville one, there may be some useful pointers to be gained from a study of their living arrangements, since of all the indigenes in Melanesia the Tolai have moved farthest in the direction of western-type economy and style of living. Fortunately the ground work for such a study is already available in the publications and field notes of Drs. A. L. and S. Epstein, anthropologists attached to the Research School of Pacific Studies, ANU.

DP 000190

CONFIDENTIAL

In fact the proximity of the Epsteins, and of the peculiarly qualified Mr. Oram, mentioned above, leads me to recommend to C.R.A. management that it engage these 3 to consult with C.R.A.'s own engineering services (and perhaps in consultation with the Territory's housing commission and with the C.S.I.R.O. Building Division) to work out architectural plans for the proposed indigenous and expatriate-indigenous residential units on Bougainville.

DP 000191

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